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Abstract
We study dynamic selection of governments under different political institutions, with a special focus
on institutional "flexibility"
. A government consists of a subset of the individuals in the society. The
competence level of the government in office determines collective utilities (e.g., by determining the
amount and quality of public goods), and each individual derives additional utility from being part of
the government (e.g., corruption or rents from holding office). We characterize dynamic evolution of
governments and determine the structure of stable governments, which arise and persist in equilibrium.
Perfect democracy, where current members of the government do not have an incumbency ad\-antage or
special powers, always leads to the emergence of the most competent government. However, any deviation
from perfect democracy destroys this result. There is always at least one other, less competent government
that is also stable and can persist forever, and even the least competent government can persist forever
in office. Moreover, a greater degree of democracy may lead to worse governments. In contrast, in the
presence of stochastic shocks or changes in the environment, greater democracy corresponds to greater
flexibility and increases the probability that high competence governments will come to power. This
result suggests that a particular advantage of democratic regimes may be their greater adaptability to
changes rather than their performance under given conditions. Finally, we show that, in the presence
of stochastic shocks, "royalty-like" dictatorships may be more successful than "junta-like" dictatorships,
because they might also be more adaptable to change.
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1 Introduction
A central role of (successful) political institutions is to ensure the selection of the right (honest,
competent, motivated) politicians. Beslej- (2005, p. 43), for example, quotes James Madison, to
emphasize the importance of the selection of politicians for the success of a society:
"The aim of every political Constitution, is or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers
men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common
good of society: and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for
keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust."
Equally important, but less often stressed, is the "flexibihty" of institutions, meaning their
ability to deal with shocks and changing situations, for example by adapting the nature of the
government and changing the characteristics of those in power in response to changes in the
environment.^ In this paper, we construct a simple dynamic model of government formation
to highlight the potential sources of inefficiency in the selection of governments and to identify
features of political processes that create "institutional flexibilitj'" .'
The "government" is made up of a subset of the citizens (e.g., each three-player group
may be a government, etc.). Each (potential) government has a different level of competence,
determining the collective utility it provides to citizens (e.g., the level of public goods). Each
individual also receives rents from being part of the government (additional income, utiUty
of office, or rents from corruption). New governments are put in place by a combination of
"votes" from the citizens and "consent" from current government members. The extent of
necessary consent of current government members is a measure of the "degree of democracy".
For example, a perfect democracy can be thought of as a situation in which current incumbents
have no special power and no such consent is necessary. Many political institutions, in contrast,
provide additional decision-making or blocking power to current government members. For
instance, in many democracies, various sources of incumbency advantage make the government
in power harder to oust than instituting it anew would have been had it been out of power (e.g.,
Cox and Katz, 1996, for a discussion of such incumbency advantage in mature democracies).
'For instance, the skills necessary for successful wartime politicians and governments are very difTerent from
those that are useful for the successful management of the economy during peacetime, as illustrated perhaps most
clearly by Winston Churchill's political career.
"Even though we model changes in the underlying environment and the competences of different governments
as resulting from stochastic shocks, in practice these may also result from deterministic changes in the nature of
the economy. For example, authoritarian regimes such as the rule of General Park in South Korea or Lee Kuan
Yew in Singapore may be beneficial or less damaging during the early stages of development, while a different
style of government, with greater participation, may be necessary as the economy develops and becomes more
complex. Aceraoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) suggest that "appropriate" institutions may be a function of the
distance of an economy to the world technology frontier, and Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2009) provide empirical
evidence consistent with this pattern.
In nondemocratic societies, this advantage of current government members is more pronounced,
even palpable: only new governments that include some members of pre-\aous governments might
be feasible (as, unfortunately, illustrated by the recent events in Zimbabwe or Iran). While the
degree of incumbency advantage is not the only characteristic of democracy, focusing on this
specific metric allows a simple parameterization of different regimes, ranging from personalistic
dictatorship to representative democracy, and thus leads to informative comparisons between
these regimes both in stochastic and nonstochastic environments.
The first contribution of our paper is to provide a general and tractable framework for the
study of such dynamic political selection issues and to provide a detailed characterization of
the structure (and efficiency) of the selection of politicians under different political institutions.
Perfect democracies always ensure the emergence of the best (most competent) government.
In contrast, under any other arrangement, incompetent and bad governments can emerge and
persist despite the absence of information-related challenges to selecting good politicians. For ex-
ample, e-\^en a small departiire from perfect democracy, whereb)' only one member of the current
government needs to consent to a new government, may make the worst possible government
persist fore\'er. The intuitive explanation for wh}' even a small degree of incumbenc}' advantage
might lead to such outcomes is as follows: improvements away from a bad (or even the worst)
government might lead to another potential government that is itself unstable and will open the
way for a further round of changes. If this process ultimately leads to a government that does not
have any common members with the initial government, then it may fail to get the support of
any of the initial government members. In this case, the initial government survives even though
it has a low, or even possibly the lowest, level of competence. This result provides a potential
explanation for why many autocratic or semi-autocratic regimes, including those currently in
power in Iran. Russia, Venezuela and Zimbabwe, resist the inclusion of "competent technocrats"
in the government—because they are afraid that these technocrats can later become supporters
of further reform, ultimately unseating even the most powerful current incumbents.^
Another important implication of these dynamic interactions in political selection is that,
beyond perfect democracy, there is no obvious ranking among different shades of imperfect
democracy (and dictatorships). Any of these different regimes may lead to better governments
in the long run. This result is consistent with the empirical findings in the literature that
show no clear-cut relationship between democracy and economic performance (e.g., Przeworski
and Limongi, 1997, Barro, 1997, Minier, 1999). In fact, both mider imperfect democracies
and extreme dictatorships, the competence of the equilibrium government and the success of
For example, on Iranian politics and resistance to the inclusion of technocrats during Khomeini's reign, see
Meneishri (2001), and more recently under Ahmadinejad's presidency, see Alfoneh (2008). On Russian politics
under Vladimir Putin, see Baker and Glasser (2007). On Zimbabwe under Mugabe, see Meredith (2007).
the society depend strongly on the identity of the initial members of the government. This is
consistent with the emphasis in the recent pohtical science and economics literatures on the role
that leaders may play under weak institutions (see, for example, Brooker, 2000, or Jones and
Olken, 2004, who show that the death of an autocrat leads to a significant change in growth,
and this does not happen with democratic leaders).
Our second contribution relates to the study of institutional fiexibilit}'. For this purpose,
we enrich the above-mentioned framework with shocks that change the competences of different
types of governments (thus capturing potential changes in the needs of the society for different
types of skills and expertise). Although the systematic and tractable analj'sis of this class
of dynamic games is challenging, we provide a characterization of the structure of equilibria
when stochastic shocks are sufficiently infrequent. Using this characterization, we show how
the quahty (competence level) of governments evolves in the presence of stochastic shocks and
how this evolution is impacted by pohtical institutions. While, without shocks, a greater degree
of democracy (beyond perfect democracy) does not necessarily guarantee a better government,
the pattern that emerges when we turn to institutional flexibility is different. In particular, our
anah'sis shows that a greater degree of democracy leads to better outcomes in the long run; in
particular, it increases the probabihty that the best government will be in power. Intuitively,
this is because a greater degree of democracy enables greater adaptability to changes in the
en\dronment (which alter the relative ranking of governments in terms of quahty). This result
therefore formalizes the notion that more democratic institutions ensure greater flexibility."* At
a shghtl}' more technical level, this result reflects the fact that when the degree of democracy is
high, there are "relatively few" other stable governments near a stable government, so a shock
that destabilizes the current government likely leads to a big jump in competence.
Finally, we also show that in the presence of shocks, "royalty-like" nondemocratic regimes,
where some individuals must always be in the government, may lead to better long-run outcomes
than "junta-like" regimes, where a subset of the current members of the junta can block change
(even though no speciflc member is essential). The royalty-like regimes might sometimes allow
greater adaptation to change because one (or more) of the members of the initial government is
secure in her position. In contrast, as discussed above, without such security the fear of further
changes might block all competence-increasing reforms in government.
We now illustrate some of the basic ideas with a simple example.
'The stochastic analysis also shows that random shocks to the identity of the members of the government
may sometimes lead to better governments in the long run because they destroy stable incompetent governments.
Besley (2005) writes: "History suggests that four main methods of selection to political office are available:
drawing lots, heredity, the use of force and voting." Our model suggests why, somewhat paradoxically, drawing
lots, which was used in Ancient Greece, might sometimes lead to better long-run outcomes than the alternatives.
Example 1 Suppose that the society consists of n > 6 of individuals. Assume that any /c = 3
individuals could form a government. A change in govermnent requires both the support of
the majority of the population and the consent of / = 1 member of the government, so that
there is an imperfect democracy, with a "minimal" degree of incumbency advantage. Suppose
that individual j has a level of competence jj, and order the individuals, without loss of any
generaUty, in descending order according to their competence, so 71 > 72 > ... > 7„. The
competence of a government is the sum of the competences of its three members. Each individual
obtains utility from the competence level of the government and also a large rent from being in
ofRce, so that each prefers to be in office regardless of the competence level of the government.
Suppose also that individuals have a sufficiently high discount factor, so that the future matters
relative to the present.
It is straightforward to determine the stable governments that will persist and remain in
power once formed. Evidently, {1,2,3} is a stable government, since it has the highest level
of competence, so neither a majority of outsiders nor members of the government would like
to initiate a change (some outsiders may want to initiate a change: for example, 4, 5, and 6
would prefer government {4, 5, 6}, but they do not have the power to enforce such a change). In
contrast, governments of the form {1, i, j} , {i, 2, j}, and {i, j, 3} are unstable (for i,j > 3), which
means that starting with these governments, there will necessarily be a change. In particular, in
each of these cases, {1, 2, 3} will receive support from both one current member of government
and from the rest of the population, who would be willing to see a more competent government.
Consider next the case where n = 6 and suppose that the society starts with the government
{4,5,6}. This is also a stable government, even though it is the lowest competence government
and thus the worst possible option for the society as a whole. This is because any change in
government must result in anew government of one of the following three forms: {l,i,j}, {i,2,j},
or {i,j, 3}. But we know that all of these types of governments are unstable. Therefore, any
of the more competent governments will ultimately take us to (1. 2,3}, which does not include
any of the members of the initial government. Since individuals are relatively patient, none of
the initial members of the government would support (consent to) a change that will ultimately
exclude them. As a consequence, the initial worst government persists forever. Returning to
our discussion of the unwillingness of certain governments to include skilled technocrats, this
example shows why such a technocrat, for exarnple individual 1, will not be included in the
government {4,5,6}, even though he would potentially increase the qualit}' and competence of
the government substantially.
One can also verify easily that {4,5.6} is also a stable government when / = 3, since in
this case any change requires the support of all three members of government and none of them
would consent to a change. Therefore, a greater degree of democracjr (lower I) does not guarantee
better outcomes in the long run. In contrast, under I = 2, {4,5,6} is not a stable government,
so the lower degree of democracy can improve the qualit)' of the government.
Now consider the same environment as above, but with potential changes in the competences
of the agents. For example, individual 4 may see an increase in his competence, so that he be-
comes the third most competent agent (i.e., 74 G (73,72))- Suppose that shocks are sufficiently
infrequent so that stability of governments in periods without shocks is given by the same reason-
ing as for the nonstochastic case. Consider the situation starting with the government {4, 5, 6}
and / = 1. Then, this government will remain in power until the shock occurs. Nevertheless, the
equilibrium government will eventually converge to {1,2,3}; at some point a shock will change
the relative competences of agents 3 and 4, and the go^'ermxlent {4, 5, 6} would become unstable,
because now individual 4 would support the emergence of the government {1,2,4}, wliich now
has the highest competence. In contrast, when I = 3, the ruhng government will remain in power
even after the shock. This simple example thus illustrates how, even though a greater degree
of democracy does not ensure better outcomes in nonstochastic environments, it may provide
greater flexibility and hence better long-run outcomes in the presence of shocks.
Our paper is related to several different literatures. While much of the literature on political
economy focuses on the role of political institutions in providing (or failing to provide) the
right incentives to politicians (see, among others, Barro, 1973, Ferejohn, 1986, Besley and Case,
1995, Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997, Niskanen, 1971, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, Acemoglu,
Robinson and Verdier, 2004, Padro-i-Miquel, 2007), there is also a small (but growing) literature
investigating the selection of politicians, most notably. Banks and Sundaram (1998), Diermeier,
Keane, and Merlo (2005), and Besley (2005). The main challenge facing the society and the
design of political institutions in these papers is that the ability and motivations of politicians
are not observed by voters or outside parties. Wliile such information-related selection issues
are undoubtedly important, our paper focuses on the difficulties in ensuring that the "right"
government is selected even when information is perfect and common. Also differently from
these literatures, we emphasize the importance of institutional flexibihty in the face of shocks.
Besley and Coate (1997, 1998), Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2003), CaselU and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004), Mattozzi and Merlo (2006),
and Besley and Kudamatsu (2009) provide alternative and complementary "theories of bad gov-
ernments/politicians". For example, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) emphasize the composition
of the "selectorate," the group of players that can select governments, as an important factor in
leading to inefficient governments and policies. CaseUi and Morelli (2004) suggest that voters
might be unwilling to replace the corrupt incumbent by a challenger whom they expect to be
equally corrupt. Mattozzi and Merlo (2006) argue that more competent politicians have higher
opportunity costs of entering politics. Also notable is the recent work by Besley and Kudamatsu
(2009), which relates the success of autocratic regimes to their ability to select politicians, which
is in turn related to the composition of the "selectorate" (as defined by Bueno de Mesquita et al.,
2003). However, these papers do not develop the potential persistence in bad governments result-
ing from dynamics of government formation and do not focus on the importance of institutional
fiexibilit}'. We are also not aware of other papers providing a comparison of different political
regimes in terms of the selection of politicians under nonstochastic and stochastic conditions.
McKelvey and Reizman (1992) suggest that seniority rules in the Senate and the House
create an endogenous incumbency advantage, and current members of these bodies will have an
incentive to introduce such seniority rules. Our results are also related to recent work on the
persistence of bad governments and inefficient institutions, including Acemoglu and Robinson
(2008), Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2007), and Egorov and Sonin (2004).
^
More closely related to our work are prior analyses of dynamic political equilibria in the
context of club formation as in Roberts (1991) and Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001), as
well as dynamic analyses of choice of constitutions and equilibrium political institutions as in
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Barbera and Jackson (2004), Matthias and Polborn (2004),
and Lagunoff (2006). Our recent work, Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008), provides a general
framework for the analysis of the dynamics of constitutions, coahtions and clubs. The current
paper is a continuation of this hne of research. It differs from our previous work in a number
of important dimensions. First, the focus here is on the substantive questions concerning the
relationship between different political institutions and the selection of politicians and govern-
ments, which is new, relatively unexplored, and (in our view) important. Second, this paper
extends our previous work by allowing for stochastic shocks and enables us to investigate issues
of institutional flexibility. Third, it involves for a structure of preferences for which our previous
results cannot be directly applied.^ ' • " -
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
introduces the concept of (Markov) political equilibrium, which allows a general and tractable
characterization of equilibria in tliis class of games. Section 4 provides our main results on the
comparison of different regimes in terms of selection of governments and politicians. Section
5 extends the analysis to allow for stochastic changes in the competences of the members of
the society and presents a comparison of different regimes in the presence of stochastic shocks.
"Acemoglu (2008) also emphasizes the potential benefits of democracy in the long run, but through a different
channel—because the alternative, oligarchy, creates entry barriers and sclerosis.
""In particular, the results in Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2008) apply under a set of acyclicity conditions.
Such acyclicity does not hold in the current paper (see Appendix B). This makes the general characterization of
the structure of equilibria both more challenging and of some methodological interest.
Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains all of the proofs of the results stated in the text,
while Appendix B considers an extensive-form game with explicitly specified proposal and voting
procedures, and shows the equivalence between the Markov perfect equilibria of this game and
the (simpler) notion of pohtical equilibrium used in the text.
2 Model
We consider a dynamic game in discrete time indexed by i = 0,1,2 The population is
represented by the set J and consists of n < oo individuals. We refer to non-empty subsets of
X as coalitions and denote the set of coalitions by C. We also designate a subset of coalitions
^ C C as the set of feasible governments. For example, the set of feasible governments could
consist of aU groups of individuals of size /cq (for some integer fco) or all groups of individuals of
size greater than /cj and less than some other integer /c2. To simpUfy the discussion, we define
k = maxGsg \G\, so k is the upper bound for the size of any feasible goverrmient: i.e., for any
G € Q, \G\ < k. It is natural to presume that k < n/2.
In each period, the society is ruled by one of the feasible governments G* € Q. The initial
government G^ is given as part of the description of the game and G^ for i > is determined
in equilibrium as a result of the political process described below. The government in power at
any date affects three aspects of the society:
1. It influences collective utilities (for example, by providing public goods or influencing how
competently the government functions).
2. It determines individual utilities (members of the government may receive additional utility
because of rents of being in office or corruption).
3. It indirectly influences the future evolution of governments by shaping the distribution of
pohtical power in the society (for example, by creating incumbency advantage in democ-
racies or providing greater decision-making power or veto rights to members of the gov-
ernment under alternative pohtical institutions).
We now describe each of these in turn. The influence of the government on coUective utilities
is modeled via its competence. In particular, at each date t, there exists a function
designating the competence of each feasible government G G G (at that date). We refer to
r^ € E as government G's competence, with the convention that higher values correspond to
greater competence. In Section 4, we will assume that each individual has a certain level of
7
competence or ability, and the competence of a government is a function of the abihties of its
members. For now, this additional assumption is not necessary. Note also that the function
r* depends on time. This generality is introduced to allow for changes in the en^dronment (in
particular, changes in the relative competences of different individuals and governments).
Individual utilities are determined by the competence of the government that is in power
at that date and by whether the individual in question is herself in the government. More
specifically, each individual i £ X at time r has discounted (expected) utility given by
t/f = E5^;:^;3('-M, (1)
where /3 £ (0, 1) is the discount factor and u^ is individual's stage payoff, given by
uH^^(G^^*GO=^«.(G'), (2)
where in the second equality we suppress dependence on F^, to simplify notation; we will do
this throughout unless special emphasis is necessary. Throughout, we impose the following
assumptions on if,;.
Assumption 1 The function Wi satisfies the following properties:
1. for each i G T and any G.H (E Q such that F^ > F^; if i E G or i ^ H , then Wi [G) >
wi{H). ; ; .
,
•
„.
2.foranyG,HeGandanyieG\H,Wi{G)>Wi{H). ;- :
Part 1 of this assumption is a relatively mild restriction on payoffs. It imphes that all else
equal, more competent governments give higher stage payoff. In particular, if an individual
belongs to both governments G and H, and G is more competent than H, then she prefers
G. The same conclusion also holds when the individual is not a member of either of these two
governments or when she is only a member of G (and not of H). Therefore, this part of the
assumption implies that the only situation in which an individual may prefer a less competent
government to a more competent one is when she is a member of the former, but not of the
latter. This simply captures the presence of rents from holding office or additional income from
being in government due to higher salaries or corruption. The interesting interactions in our
setup result from the "conflict of interest" : individuals prefer to be in the government even when
this does not benefit the rest of the society. Part 2 of the assumption strengthens the first part
and imposes that this conflict of interest is always present; that is, individuals receive higher
payoffs from governments that include them than from those that exclude them (regardless
of the competence levels of the two governments). We impose both parts of this assumption
throughout. It is important to note that Assumption 1 imphes that all voters, who are not part
of the government, care about a one-dimensional government competence; this featm-e simplifies
the analysis considerably. Nevertheless, the tractability of our framework makes it possible to
enrich this en\'ironment by allowing other sources of disagreement or conflict of interest among
voters, and we return to this issue in the Conclusion.
We next provide an example that makes some of these notions slightly more concrete.
Example 2 Suppose that the competence of government G, Fq, is the amount of public good
produced in the economy under feasible government G, and
': w^[G) = vaTG) + b,l^^eG], (3)
where Uj- : R ^ R is a strictly increasing function (for each i G J) corresponding to the utility
from public good for individual i, 6, is a measure of the rents that individual i obtains froiri
being in office, and ly is the indicator of event A'. If 6, > for each i e X, then (3) satisfies part
1 of Assumption 1. In addition, if 6,; is sufHciently large for each z, then each individual prefers
to be a member of the government, even if this government has a very low level of competence,
thus part 2 of Assumption 1 is also satisfied.
Finally, the government in power influences the determination of future go^^ernments when-
ever consent of some current government members is necessary for change. We represent the set
of indi\'iduals (regular citizens and government members) who can, collect! veh', induce a change
in government by specifying the set of winning coalitions^ VVc which is a function of current
government G (for each G G G). This is an economical way of summarizing the relevant infor-
mation, since the set of winning coalitions is precisely the subsets of the society that are able to
force (or to block) a change in government. We only impose a minimal amount of structure on
the set of winning coalitions.
Assumption 2 For any feasible government G a Q , V\)g ?s given by
Wg = {X e C : \X\ > mc and \X H G| > Ig)
,
where Ig and tug are integers satisfying < Ig < \G\ < k < niG < n — k (recall that k is the
maximal size of the government and n is the size of the society).
The restrictions imposed in Assumption 2 are intuitive. In particular, they state that a new
government can be instituted if it receives a sufficient number of votes from the entire society
{ruG total votes) and if it receives support from some subset of the members of the current
government {Ig of the current government members need to support such a change). This
definition allows Ig to be any number between and |G|. One special feature of Assumption
2 is that it does not relate the number of veto players in the current government, Ic, to the
total nmnber of individuals in the society who wish to change the government, mo- This aspect
of Assumption 2 can be relaxed without affecting our general characterization; we return to a
discussion of this issue in the Conclusion.
Given this notation, the case where Iq = should be thought of as perfect democracy, where
current members of the government have no special power, and the case where Ig = \G\ as
extreme dictatorship, where unanimity among government members is necessary for any change.
Between these extremes are imperfect democracies (or less strict forms of dictatorships), which
may arise either because there is some form of (strong or weak) incumbency advantage in democ-
racy or because current government (junta) members are able to block the introduction of a new-
government. Note also that we imposed some mild assumptions on niG- In particular, less than
k individuals is insufficient for a change to take place. This ensures that a rival government
cannot take power without any support from other individuals (recall that k denotes the maxi-
mum size of the government, so the rival government must have no more than k members), and
TTT-G < n — k individuals are sufficient to implement a change provided that Ig members of the
current government are among them. For example, these requirements are naturally met when
k < n/2 and mc = [{n + 1) /2J (i.e., majority rule).'^
In addition to Assumptions 1 and 2, we also impose the following genericity assumption,
which ensures that different governments have different competences. This assumption simplifies
the notation and is without much loss of generality, since if it were not satisfied for a society,
any small perturbation of competence levels would restore it.
Assumption 3 For any i > and any G, H <E Q such that G ^ H , F^ ^ Fj^.
3 Political Equilibria in Nonstochastic Environments
In this section, we focus on nonstochastic environments, where F' = F (or F^ = Tg for all
G £ Q). For these environments, we introduce our equilibrium concept, (Markov) political
equilibrium, and show that equilibria have a simple recursive characterization.^ We return to
the more general stochastic environments in Section 5.
Recall also that [x\ denotes the integer part of a real number x.
Throughout, we refer to this equilibrium concept as "political equilibrium'' or simply as "equilibrium". We
do not use the acronym MPE, which will be used for Markov perfect equilibrium in Appendix B.
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3.1 Political Equilibrium
Our equilibrium concept, (Markov) political equilibrium, imposes that onl)' transitions from the
current go\'ernment to a new government that maximize the discounted utility of a winning
coalition will take place; and if no such transition exists, the current government will be stable
(i.e., it will persist in equiUbrium). The qualifier "Markov" is added since this definition im-
plicitly imposes that transitions from the current to a new government depend on the current
government—not on the entire history. — -
To introduce this equilibrium concept more formally, let us first define the transition rule
(j) : G ^ G, which maps each feasible government G in power at time t to the government that
would emerge in period t + 1.^ Given cf), we can write the discounted utility implied by (1) for
each indi\'idual i G J starting from current government G G G recursively as Vj {G \ cb), given bj'
V, (G\(P)= w, (G) + BVi i4> (G) ! 4>) for all G e G. (4)
Intuitivel}', starting from G & G, individual i e J receives a current payoff of u'j (G). Then (p
(uniquely) determines next period's government 4){G), and thus the continuation value of this
individual, discounted to the current period, is (3Vi {4>{G)
\
4>).
A government G is stable given mapping if (ji (G) = G. In addition, we say that (p is acyclic
if for any (possibly infinite) chain Hi, H2, C G such that i^fc+i € <p {Hj^), and any a < b < c,
if Ha = He then Ha = Hb = He-
Given (4), the next definition introduces the notion of a political equilibrium, which will be
represented by the mapping d provided that two conditions are met.
Definition 1 A mapping (p : G —^ G constitutes a (Markov) political equilibrium if for any
G G G, the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) either the set of players who prefer 4>{G) to G (in terms of discounted utility) forms a
winning coalition, i.e., 5 = {i £ X : Vj {4>{G)
\
4>) > Vi{G \ (p)} G Wq, (or equivalently \S\ > mo
and !5 n G| > Ic); or else, cp (G) = G;
. (ii) there is no alternative government H G G that is preferred both to a transi-
tion to (p{G) and to staying in G permanently, i.e., there is no H such that S'^q =
{iGl: V, (H\(P)> V, [^ (G)
I
^)} G Wg and S'Ij = {i G I : V, {H \ <P) > w, (G) / (1 - /?)} G
Wg (alternatively, for any alternative H , either \S'^\ < mc- or \S'fj D G\ < Ic, or \S'lf\ < mo,
or\S'lfnG\<lc).
"in principle, (p could be set-valued, mapping from Q into V (Q) (the power set of G), but our analysis be-
low shows that, thanks to Assumption 3, its image is always a singleton (i.e., it is a "function" rather than a
"correspondence," and also by implication, it is uniquely defined). We impose this feature to simplify the notation.
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This definition states that a mapping cf) constitutes a pohtical equilibrium ("is a political
equihbrium") if it maps the current government G to alternative 4> (G) that (unless it coincides
with G) must be preferred to G by a sufRcient majority of the population and a sufficient number
of current government members (so as not to be blocked). Note that in part (i), the set S could
have alternatively been written as S = {i £ I : Vi{(l) (G) \ cf)) > Wi (G) / (1 — /?) } , since if this set
is not a winning coalition, then cp (G) = G and thus Vi{G
\
4>) = Wi (G) / (1 — P)- Part (ii) of
the definition requires that there does not exist another alternative H that would have been a
"more preferable" transition; that is, there should be no H that is preferred both to a transition
to (p (G) and to stajdng in G forever by a sufficient majority of the population and a sufficient
number of current government members. The latter condition is imposed, since if there exists a
subset H that is preferred to a transition to (j) (G) but not to staying in G forever, then at each
stage a move to H can be blocked. ^"^
We take the definition of political equilibrium given in Definition 1 as a primitive and use it
in this and the next section. The advantage of this definition is that it is simple and economical.
A possible disadvantage is that it does not explicitly specify how offers for different types of
transitions are made and the exact sequences of events at each stage. '^ In Appendix B, we
specify the sequences in which offers are made, voting takes place, and when transitions can
take place exphcitly, and characterize the Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) of this extended
environment. We show that for high discount factors, MPE coincide with our definition of
pohtical equilibria.
3.2 Genercd Characterization
We now prove the existence and provide a characterization of political equilibria. We start with
a recursive characterization of the mapping 4> described in Definition 1. Let us enumerate the
elements of the set Q as {Gi, G2, ..., Gigj} such that Tq^ > ^Gy whenever x < y. With this
enumeration, Gi is the most competent ("best") government, while Gigi is the least competent
government. In view of Assumption 3, this enumeration is well defined and unique.
Now, suppose that for some q > 1, we have defined cp for all Gj with j < q. Define the set
Mg = {j:l<j<q,{iel:w, (G,) > w^ (G,)} G Wg,, and (G,) = G,} . (5)
Note that this set depends simply on stage payoffs in (2), not on the discounted utilities defined
in (4), which are "endogenous" objects. This set can thus be computed easily from the primitives
' The explicit game form in Appendix B clarifies this further.
"'In this regard, our equilibrium concept is similar to the concept of Markov voting equilibrium in Roberts
(1999).
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of the model (for each q). Given this set, let the mapping be
''
rhtr \ / '^9 ifMq = 0; •, ,
•
t '^mm{je.M,} II yWg fi fe3.
Since the set .Mg is well defined, the mapping 4> is also well defined, and by construction it is single
valued. Theorems 1 and 2 next show that, for sufficiently high discount factors, this mapping
constitutes the unique acyclic political equilibrium and that, under additional mild conditions,
it is also the unique political equilibrium (even considering possible cyclic equilibria).
Theorem 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold and let cp : Q ^ Q be as defined in (6). Then
there exists /3q < 1 such that for any discount factor j3 > j3q, 4> is the unique acyclic political
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Let us now illustrate the intuition for why the mapping (p constitutes a political equilibrium.
Recall that Gi is the most competent ( "best" ) government. It is clear that we must have cp (Gi ) =
Gi, since all members of the population that are not in Gi will prefer it to any other G' G Q
(from Assumption 1). Assumption 2 then ensures that there will not be a winning coalition in
i&voi of a permanent move to G' . HoweA'er, G' may not persist itself, and it may eventuallj'
lead to some alternative government G" E G- But in this case, we can apply this reasoning
to G" instead of G', and thus the conclusion (i>[Gi) = Gj applies. Next suppose we start
with government G2 in power. The same argument apphes if G' is any one of G3, G4 G\g\-
One of these may eventually lead to Gi, thus for sufhciently high discount factors, a sufficient
majority of the population may support a transition to such a G' in order to eventuaUy reach
Gi. However, discounting also implies that in this case, a sufficient majority would also prefer
a direct transition to Gi to this dynamic path (recall part (ii) of Definition 1). So the relevant
choice for the society is between Gi and G2- In this comparison, Gi will be preferred if it has
sufficiently many supporters, that is, if the set of individuals preferring Gi to Go is a winning
coalition within G2, or more formally if
{iGl:u',(Gi) >k;, (G2)} e Wgj.
If this is the case, (b{G2) = G\\ otherwise, d{G2) = G2. This is exactly what the function 4)
defined in (6) stipulates. Now let us start from government G3. We then only need to consider
the choice between Gi, G2, and G3. To move to Gj, it suffices that a winning coahtion within G3
prefers Gi to G3.^' However, whether the society will transition to G2 depends on the stability
'"If some winning coalition also prefers G2 to G3, then Gi should still be chosen over G2, because only members
of Gj who do not belong to Gi prefer Go to Gi, and Assumption 2 ensures that those preferring Gi over G2
(starting in G3) also form a winning coalition. Then a transition to G2 is ruled out by part (ii) of Definition 1.
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of G2. In particular, we may have a situation in which G2 is not a stable government, which, by
necessity, impUes that (/> {G2) = G\. Then a transition to G2 will lead to a permanent transition
to Gi in the next period. However, this sequence may be non-desirable for some of those who
prefer to move to G2- In particular, there may exist a winning coalition in Gs that prefers to stay
in G3 rather than transitioning permanently to Gi (and as a consequence, there is no winning
coalition that prefers such a transition), even though there also exists a winning coahtion in G3
that would have preferred a permanent move to G2. Writing this more explicitly, we may have
that
{iGT:u.',(G2)>u.,(G3)}e Wg3,
but
{ieI:Wi{Gi)>w,{Gi)}iWG,.
If so, the transition from G3 to G2 may be blocked with the anticipation that it will lead to Gi
which does not receive the support of a winning coalition within G3. This reasoning illustrates
that for a transition to take place, not only should the target government be preferred to the
current one by a winning coahtion (starting from the current government), but also that the
target government should be "stable," i.e., 4>[G') = G' . This is exactly the requirement in (6).
In this light, the intuition for the mapping (p and thus for Theorem 1 is that a government
G will persist in equilibrium (will be stable) if there does not exist another stable government
receiving support from a winning coalition (a sufficient majority of the population and the
required number of current members of government). -, ' ,, '
Theorem 1 states that cp in (6) is the unique acyclic political equilibrium. However, it does
not rule out cyclic equilibria. We provide an example of a cyclic equilibrium in Appendix B (see
Example 11). Cyclic equilibria are unintuitive and "fragile". We next show that they can also
be ruled out under a variety of relatively weak assumptions. The next theorem thus strengthens
Theorem 1 so that (p in (6) is the unique political equilibrium (among both cyclic and acychc
ones).
Theorem 2 The mapping
<f> defined in (6) is the unique political equilibrium (and hence in the
light of Theorem 1, any political equilibrium is acyclic) if any of the following conditions holds:
1. For any G & Q , \G\ = k, Iq = I and tuq = m for som.e k, I and m.
2. For any G GQ. Ig>1-
3. For any collection of different feasible governments Hi, ... , Hq G Q (for q > 2) and for all
i £ I, we have Wi (i/i) ^ \2_] ^^ (-^p)) /?•
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4-9 > e \g\, where B = rmu,^,^j ,„,^g,h^Q: i&G\H} {^dG) - w,{H)] and e =
max{,gj
„„rf G,Hee; zeGnH} {w') (G) - u', (iJ)}.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This theorem states four relatively mild conditions under which there are no cyclic equilibria
(thus making (p in (6) the unique equihbrium). First, if all feasible governments have the same
size, /c, the same degree of incumbency advantage, /, and the same threshold for the required
number of total votes for change, tti, then all equilibria must be acyclic and thus (p in (6) is the
unique political equilibrium. Second, the same conclusion applies if we always need the consent
of at least one member of the current government for a transition to a new government. These
two results implj' that cyclic equilibria are only possible if starting from some governments,
there is no incumbency advantage and either the degree of incumbency advantage or the vote
threshold differs across governments (see Example 11 in Appendix B). The third part of the
theorem proves that there are no acyclic political equilibria under a very mild assumption. In
fact, the requirement on payoffs imposed in this part of the theorem is a slight strengthening of
Assumption 3 and also holds generically (meaning that if it did not hold, a small perturbation of
payoff functions would restore it).^"^ Finallj', the fourth part of the theorem provides a condition
on preferences that also rules out cyclic equilibria. In particular, this condition states that if
each individual receives sufficiently high utility fi-om being in govermnent (greater than 6*) and
does not care much about the composition of the rest of the government (the difference in her
utility between any two governments including her is always less than e), then all equilibria must
be acyclic. In Appendix B, we show (Example 11) how a cyclic political equilibrium is possible
if neither of the four sufficient conditions in Theorem 2 holds.
4 Characterization of Nonstochcistic Transitions
In this section, we compare different political regimes in terms of their abihty to select gov-
ernments with high levels of competence. To simplify the exposition and focus on the more
important interactions, we assume that all feasible governments have the same size, fc G N,
where k < n/2. More formally, let us define
&' = {Y eC: \Y\ = k].
Then, Q — C^\ In addition, we assume that for any G S C;, i^j = / g N and mo = m e N, so
that the set of winning coalitions can be simply expressed as
Wg = {A' eC:\X\>m and \X n G| > /}
,
(7)
'"This requirement is exactly the same as Assumption 3' we impose in Appendix B in the analysis of the
extensive form game.
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where 0<l<k<m<n — k. This specification impUes that given n, k, and m, the number /
corresponds to an inverse measure of democracy. If I = 0, then all individuals have equal weight
and there is no incumbency advantage, thus we have a perfect democracy. In contrast, if / > 0,
the consent of some of the members of the government is necessary for a change, thus we have
an imperfect democracy. We thus have strengthened Assumption 2 to the following.
Assumption 2' We have that Q = C^ , and that there exist integers I and m such that the set
of winning coalitions is given by (7).
In view of part 1 of Theorem 2, Assumption 2' ensures that the acyclic political equilibrium
(f) given by (6) is the unique equilibrium; naturally, we will focus on this equilibrium throughout
the rest of the analysis. In addition, given this additional structure, the mapping (p can be
wTitten in a simpler form. Recall that governments are still ranked according to their level of
competence, so that Gi denotes the most competent government. Then we have:
Mq = {j:l<j< q, \Gj n Gg\ > I, and {Gj) - Gj}
, (8)
and, as before,
Gg iiMq = 0;
'"'
1 Gr^;„(iaM.\ if Ma ¥=0.
Naturally, the mapping is again well defined and unique. Finally, let us also define
,, ,. .._ V={Geg:cP[G)=G]
as the set of stable governments (the fixed points of mapping <^). If G G P, then (l){G) = G,
and this government will persist forever if it is the initial government of the society.
We now in^'estigate the structure of stable governments and how it changes as a function of
the underlying political institutions, in particular, the degree of democracy. Throughout this
section, we assume that Assumptions 1, 2' and 3 hold, and we do not add these qualifiers to any
of the propositions to economize on space.
Our first proposition provides an important technical result (part 1). It then uses this result
to show that perfect democracy ensures the emergence of the best (most competent) government,
but any departure fi'om perfect democracy destro^'s this result and enables the emergence of
highl)' incompetent/inefficient governments. It also shows that extreme dictatorship makes all
initial governments stable, regardless of how low their competences may be.
Proposition 1 The set of stable feasible governments V satisfies the following properties.
1. IfG^H £ V and \G D H\ > I, then G = H. hi other words, any two distinct stable
governments may have at most I — 1 common members.
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2. Suppose that I = 0, so that the society is a perfect democracy. Then V = {Gj}. In
other words, starting from any initial government, the society will transition to the inost
competent government.
3. Suppose I > 1, so that the society is an imperfect democracy or a dictatorship. Then
there are at least two stable governments, i.e., \V\ > 2. Moreover, the least competent
governments may be stable.
4- Suppose I = k, so that the society is an extreme dictatorship. Then V — Q, so any feasible
government is stable.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 shows the fundamental contrast between perfect democracj', wliere there is no
incumbency advantage, and other pohtical institutions, which provide some additional power to
"insiders" (current members of the government). With perfect democracy, the best government
will necessarily emerge. With any deviation from perfect democracy, there will necessarily
exist at least one other stable government (by definition less competent than the best), and
even the worst government might be stable. The next example supplements Example 1 from
the Introduction by showing a richer environment in which the least competent government is
stable.
Example 3 Suppose n = 9, /c = 3, / = 1, and m = 5, so that a change in government requires
support from a simple majority of the societ)', including at least one member of the current
government. Suppose I = {1, 2, . . . , 9}, and that stage payoffs are given by (3) in Example 2.
Assume also that
^{^^^^2,^2] — ^000 — lOOii — 10*2 — ''s (for zi < ?2 < 'a)- This imphes that
{1, 2, 3} is the most competent government, and is therefore stable. Any other government that
includes 1 or 2 or 3 is unstable. For example, the government {2,5,9} will transit to {1,2,3},
as ah individuals except 5 and 9 prefer the latter. However, government {4,5,6} is stable: any
government that is more competent must include 1 or 2 or 3, and therefore is either {1,2,3}
or will immediately transit to {1,2,3}, which means that any such transition will not receive
support from any of the members of {4,5,6}. Now, proceeding inductiveh', we find that any
government other than {1,2,3} and {4,5,6} that contains at least one individual 1,2,...,
6
is unstable. Consequently, government {7,8,9}, which is the least competent government, is
stable.
Proposition 1 establishes that with any regime other than perfect democracy, there will
necessarily exist stable inefficient/incompetent governments and these may in fact have quite
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low le^'els of competences. It does not, howe\'er, provide a characterization of when highly
incompetent governments will be stable.
We next provide a systematic answer to this question focusing on societies with large numbers
of individuals (i.e., n large). Before doing so, we introduce an assumption that will be used in
the third part of the next proposition and in later results. In particular, in what follows we
will sometimes suppose that each individual i e I has a level of ability (or competence) given
by 7j 6 K+ and that the competence of the government is a strictly increasing function of the
abilities of its members. This is more formally stated in the next assumption.
Assumption 4 Suppose G G G, and individuals i.j £ I are such that i E G, j ^ G, and
li > Ij- Then Tq > ^ {G\{i])u{j]
The canonical form of the competence function consistent with Assumption 4 is
ra = E,,^7. (10)
though for most of our analysis, we do not need to impose this specific functional form.
Assumption 4 is useful because it enables us to rank individuals in terms of their "abilities"
.
This ranking is strict, since Assumptions 3 and 4 together imply that 7^ ^ 7, whenever i i^ j.
WTien we impose Assumption 4, we also enumerate individuals according to their abilities, so
that 7,; > 7 whenever i < j-
The next proposition shows that for societies above a certain threshold of size (as a function of
k and I), there always exist stable governments that contain no member of the ideal government
and no member of any group of certain prespecified sizes (thus, no member of groups that would
generate a range of potentially high competence governments). Then, under Assumption 4, it
extends this result, providing a bound on the percentile of the ability distribution such that
there exist stable governments that do not include any individuals with competences above this
percentile.
Proposition 2 Suppose I > 1 (and as before, that Assumptions 1, 2' , and 3 hold).
1. If
^
then there exists a stable government G g D that contains no members of the ideal gov-
ernment Gi
.
2. Take any x eN. If
^
.
'
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then for any set of individuals X with \X\ < x, there exists a stable government G G T>
such that X n G = (so no member of set X belongs to G).
3. Suppose in addition that Assumption 4 holds and let
'
'
1
ik-iy.
I + (k I) (,_jji(j._,).
(13)
Then there exists a stable government G €. T^ that does not include any of the [pn\ highest
ability individuals.
Pi'oof. See Appendix A.
Let us provide the intuition for part 1 of Proposition 2 when I — I. RecaU that Gi is the
most competent government. Let G be the most competent government among those that do not
include members of Gi (such G exists, since n > 2/c by assumption). In this case, Proposition
2 imphes that G is stable, that is, G e V. The reason is that if cp (G) = H ^ G, then Th > Fc,
and therefore H nGi contains at least one element by construction of G. But then d [H) = Gi,
as implied by (9). Intuitively, if Z = 1, then once the cm-rent government contains a member
of the most competent government Gi, this member will consent to (support) a transition to
Gi, which will also receive the support of the population at large. She can do so, because Gi
is stable, thus there are no threats that further rounds of transitions will harm her. But then,
as in Example 1 in the Introduction, G itself becomes stable, because any reform away from
G will take us to an unstable government. Part 2 of the proposition has a similar intuition,
but it states the stronger result that one can choose any subset of the society with size not
exceeding the threshold defined in (12) such that there exist stable governments that do not
include any member of this subset (which may be taken to include several of the most competent
governments).^^ Finally, part 3, which follows immediately from part 2 under Assumption 4,
further strengthens both parts 1 and 2 of this proposition and also parts 3 and 4 of Proposition
1; it shows that there exist stable governments that do not include a certain fraction of the
highest abihty individuals. Interestingly, this fraction, given in (13), is non-monotonic in /,
reaching its maximum at / = k/2, i.e., for an "intermediate democracy". This partly anticipates
the results pertaining to the relative successes of different regimes in selecting more competent
governments, which we discuss in the next proposition.
We next turn to a more systematic discussion of this question, that is, of whether societies
with a greater degree of democracy "perform better". For tliis analysis, we suppose that As-
sumption 4 holds. The next example, which is similar to Example 1 from the Introduction, shows
^''Note that the upper bound on A' in Part 2 of Proposition 2 is 0(x), meaning that increasing x does not
require an exponential increase in the size of population n for Proposition 2 to hold.
19
that, starting with the same government, the long-run equihbrium government may be worse
when poUtical institutions are more democratic (as long as we are not in a perfect democracy).
Example 4 Take the setup from Example 3 (n = 9, /c = 3, Z = 1, and m = 5), and suppose
that the initial government is {4,5,6}. As we showed there, government {4,5,6} is stable, and
will therefore persist. Suppose, however, that / = 2 instead. In that case, {4,5,6} is unstable,
and (j) {{4,5,6}) = {1,4,5}; thus there will be a transition to {1,4,5}. Since {1,4,5} is more
competent than {4, 5, 6}, this is an example where the long-run equilibrium government is worse
under I = 1 (with "more democratic" institutions) than under / = 2 (with "less democratic"
institutions). Note that if / = 3, {4, 5, 6} would be stable again.
When either fc = 1 or /c = 2, the structure of stable governments is relatively straightforward.
(Note that in this proposition, and in the examples that follow, a, 6 or c denote the indices of
individuals, with our ranking that lower-ranked individuals have higher ability; thus 7^ > 7;,
whenever a < b.)
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1. 2' , 3 and 4 hold.
1. If k = I. then either I = (perfect democracy), in which case (j) {G) = {Gi] = {1} for any
G G Q, or I = I = k (extreme dictatorship), in which case 4> [G) = G for any G e Q.
2. If k = 2, and I = (perfect democracy), then (p (G) = Gi = {1. 2} for any G £ Q. If k = 2
and I = 1 (imperfect democracy), then if G — {a, b) with a < b, we have (f) (G) = {a — I, a}
when a is even and 6 [G] = {a
,
a
-t- 1} when a is odd; in particular, (p (G) = G if and only
if a is odd and 6 = a-fl. If k = 2 and I = 2 (extreme dictatorship), then (j){G) — G for
any G £ Q.
Proof. See Appendix A. . . - : v
Proposition 3, though simple, provides an important insight about the structure of stable
governments that will be further exploited in the next section. In the case of an iinperfect
democrac}', highlighted here with k — 2 and / = 1, the competence of the stable government is
determined by the more able of the two members of the initial government. This means that,
with rare exceptions, the quality of the initial government will improve to some degree, i.e.,
typically r^(Q) > To- However, this increase is'generally limited; when G = {a,b} with a < b,
(p{G) = {a — I, a} or 0(G) — {a,a+ 1}, so that at best the next highest ability individual is
added to the initial government instead of the lower abihty member. Therefore, summarizing
these three cases, we can say that with a perfect democracy, the best government will arise; with
an extreme dictatorship, there will be no improvement in the initial governxnent; and with an
imperfect democracy, there will be some Umited improvements in the qualit}' of the government.
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W'Tien fc > 3, the structure of stable governments is more complex, though we can still de-
velop a number of results and insights about the structure of such governments. Naturally, the
extremes with / = (perfect democracy) and / = 3 (extreme dictatorship) are again straightfor-
ward. If / = 1 and the initial government is G = {a, 6, c}, where a < b < c, then we can show
that members ranked above a — 2 will never become members of the stable government 0(G),
and the most competent member of G, a, is always a member of the stable government cp (G)}^
Therefore, again with / = 1, only incremental improvements in the quality of the initial govern-
ment are possible. This ceases to be the case when 1 — 2. In this case, it can be shown that
whenever G = {a, b, c}, where a + b < c, (p (G) 7^ G; instead (p (G) = {a, 6, d}, where d < c and in
fact, d <?C a is possible. This implies a potentially very large improvement in the quahty of the
government (contrasting with the incremental improvements in the case where / = 1). Loosely
speaking, the presence of two veto players when I = 2 allows the initial government to import
very high ability individuals without compromising stability. The next example illustrates this
feature, which is at the root of the result highlighted in Example 4, whereby greater democracy
can lead to worse stable go\'ernments.
Example 5 Suppose /c = 3, and first take the case where / = 1. Suppose G = {100, 101, 220},
meaning that the initial government consists of individuals ranked 100, 101, and 220 in terms
of ability. Then (pi-i (G) = {100, 101. 102}, that is, there will be improvements in the quahtj' of
the tliird member of the government, but not in the quality of the highest ability member (and
in this case, neither in the quality of the second highest ability member). More generally, recall
that only very limited improvements in the quality of the highest ability member are possible
in this case. Suppose instead that / = 2. Then it can be shown that 4)1^2 (G^) =" i^-' ^OO- 10^}) so
that now the stable government includes the most able individual in the society. Naturally if the
gaps in ability at the top of the distribution are larger, impljdng that highest ability individuals
ha\'e a disproportionate effect on government competence, this feature becomes particularly
valuable.
The following example extends the logic of Example 5 to any distribution and shows how,
under certain configurations, expected competence is higher under / = 2 than I = 1 under any
distribution over initial (feasible) governments.
Example 6 Suppose k — 3, and fix a (any) probability distribution over initial governments
with full support (i.e., with a positive probability of picking any initial feasible government).
'°More specifically, government G = {a, b, c), where a < 6 < c, is stable if and only if a = 6 — 1 = c — 2, and
c is a multiple of 3. Moreover, for any government G — {a,b,c} with a < b < c, (p(G) = {a — 2, a — 1, a} if a
is a multiple of 3, (p (G) = (a — 1, a, a + 1} if a + 1 is a multiple of 3, and cp (G) = {a, a + 1, a + 2} if a + 2 is a
multiple of 3.
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Assume that of players ij, . . . ,i„, the first q (where g is a multiple of 3 and 3 < g < n — 3)
are "smart," while the rest are "incompetent," so that governments that include at least one of
players ij, . .
.
, i^ will have very high competence relative to governments that do not. Moreover,
differences in competence among governments that include at least one of the players ii, . . . , i^
and also among those that do not are small relative to the gap between the two groups of
governments. Then it can be showoi that the expected competence of the stable government
4>i-2 (G) (under / = 2) is greater than that of (pi^i (G) (under / = 1)—both expectations are
evaluated according to the probability distribution fbced at the outset. This is intuitive in view of
the structure of stable governments under the two political regimes. In particular, if G includes
at least one of ii, . . . ,iq, so do (pi-i (G) and 4>i-2 {G)- But if G does not, then (f^i-i (G) will
not include them either, whereas (pi-2 {G) will include one with positive probability, since the
presence of two veto players will allow the incorporation of one of the "smart" players without
destabiUzing the government.
Conversely, suppose that Fq is very high if all its players are from {ii, . . . ,iq], and very low
otherwise. In that case, the expected competence of (f> {G) will be higher under I = 1 than under
I = 2. Indeed, if / = 1, the society will end up with a competent government if at least one
of the players is from {ii, . .
.
, iq}, while if / = 2, because there are now two veto players, there
needs to be at least two "smart" players for a competent government to form (though, when
I = 2, this is not sufficient to guarantee the emergence of a competent government either).
Examples 5 and 6 illustrate a number of important ideas. With a lower degree of democracy,
in these examples with / = 2, there are more "veto" players, and this makes a greater number of
governments near the initial government stable, leading to a higher probability of improA^ement
in the competence of some of the members of the initial government. In contrast, with a
higher degree of democracy, in these examples / = 1, fewer governments near the initial one
are stable, thus incremental improvements are more likely. Consequently, when including a few
high ability individuals in the government is very important, regimes with a lower degree of
democracy perform better (naturally, this effect is non-monotonic, and the perfect democracy,
I = 0, always performs best). Another important implication of these examples is that the
situations in which regimes with lower degrees of democrac)' may perform better are not confined
to some isolated instances. This feature applies for a broad class of configurations and for
expected competences, evaluated by taking uniform or nonuniform distributions over initial
feasible goverrmients. Nevertheless, we will see that in stochastic environments, there will be
a distinct advantage to political regimes with greater degrees of democracy, a phenomenon the
intuition of which will also be illustrated using Examples 5 and 6.
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5 Equilibria in Stochastic Environments
In this section, we introduce stochastic shocks to competences of different coahtions (or different
indiA'iduals) in order to study the fiexibihty of different pohtical institutions in their abiUt}' to
adapt the nature and the composition of the government to changes in the underlying environ-
ment. Changes in the nature and structure of "high competence" governments may result from
changes in the economic, pohtical, or social environment, which may in turn require different
t^'pes of government to deal with newly emerging problems. Our main results in this section
establish strong links between the degree of democracy and the flexibility to adapt to changing
environments.
Changes in the environment are modeled succinctly by allowng changes in the function P^ :
Q ^ R, which determines the competence associated with each feasible government. Formally,
we assume that at each i, with probability 1 — 5, there is no change in Tq from T'q , and with
probability 6, there is a shock and Tq may change. In particular, following such a shock we
assume that there exists a set of distribution functions Fp (Tq
\
T^^) that gives the conditional
distribution of Tq at time t as functions of T'q . The characterization of pohtical equilibria
in this stochastic environment is a very challenging task in general. However, we wiU show'
that when S is sufficiently small, there is a characterization very similar to that in Theorem 1
and exploit this for illustrating the main substantive implications of stochastic shocks on the
selection of governments.
In the rest of this section, we first generalize our definition of (Markov) political equilibrium
to this stochastic environment and generalize Theorems 1 and 2 (for (5 small). We then provide a
sj'stematic characterization of political transitions in this stochastic environment and illustrate
the links between the degree of democracy and institutional flexibility.
5.1 Stochastic Political Equilibria
The structure of stochastic political equilibria is complicated in general because individuals
need to consider the implications of current transitions on future transitions under a variety of
scenarios. Nevertheless, when the likelihood of stochastic shocks, 6, is sufficiently small, as we
have assumed here, then political equilibria must follow a logic similar to that given in Definition
1 in Section 3. Motivated by this reasoning, we introduce a simple definition of stochastic
political equilibria (with low probabihties of changes in the environment). Appendix B shows
that when the discount factor is high and stochastic shocks are sufficiently infrequent, MPE of
the exphcit-form game outlined there and our notions of (stochastic) political equilibrium are
again equivalent.
To introduce the notion of (stochastic Markov) political equilibriurn, let us first consider a
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set of mappings 4>{rc] ' 5 ^' G defined as in (6), but now separately for each {^G}Geg- These
mappings are indexed by {To} to emphasize this dependence. Essentially, if the configuration
of competences of different governments given by {Tcj^cg applied forever, we would be in a
nonstochastic environment and 4'irc} would be the equilibrium transition rule, or simply the
pohtical equilibrium, as shown by Theorems 1 and 2. The idea underlying our definition for
this stochastic environment with infrequent changes is that while the current configuration is
{Tq]q^q, 4>ifQ} will still determine equilibrium behavior, because the probability of a change in
competences is sufRciently small (see Appendix B). When the current configuration is {^cjceg^
cpirn] will determine political transitions, and if (pirc} (*^) ~ ^^ then G will remain in power as
a stable government. However, when a stochastic shock hits and {'^GJceg changes to {rclGGC'
then political transitions will be determined bj' the transition rule cpt^, i , and unless (pi-p, \ {G) =
G, following this shock, there wall be a transition to a new government, G" = </)rp, i (G).
Definition 2 Let the set of mappings (pirc] ' G —^ Q (a. separate mapping for each configuration
{rc}g,ggj be defined by the following two conditions. When the configuration of competences is
given by {^G}Geg' '"-'^ have that for any G G Q:
(i) the set of players who prefer (f^iYn] [G) to G (in terms of discounted utility) forms a
winning coalition, i.e., 5 = |i G J : V, \<t'{ra] (<^) I ^{rc]] >yi{G\ 'P{Tc]) \ ^ ^G',
(ii) there is no alternative government H G Q that is preferred both to a tran-
sition to (pirn} (^^ ^"''^ ^'-' staying in G permanently, i.e., there is no H such
that S'h = {zeI:F, (i^l^^r^j) > Vi((i){r^}(G)|(^{rG})} e Wg and S'fj =
jz e I : V, [i?
I ©{Fg}) > m (G) / (1 - /?)} e Wg (alternatively, |5^| < mo, or |5^ n G| < Ig,
or\S'ff\<mG, or\S'l^nG\<lG).
Then a set of mappings (Pstq} ' G ^> Q constitutes a (stochastic Markov) political equilibrium
for an environment with sufficiently infrequent changes if there is a transition to government
Gt+i at time t (starting with government Gt) if and only if {^g}g'C ~ {^G}Geg ""^ Gt+i =
^{fg} (Gt)- - :• • -" "
Therefore, a political equilibrium with sufficiently infrequent changes involves the same polit-
ical transitions (or the stabihty of governments) as those implied by the mappings (pirc] defined
in (6), applied separately for each configuration {Tg}-
The next theorem provides the general characterization of stochastic political equilibria in
environments with sufficiently infrequent changes.
Theorem 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold, and let (psrc) ' G —• G be the mapping defined
by (6) applied separately for each configuration {Tg}- Then there exists /Sg < 1 such that for
any discount factor j3 > /3q, (ptrn] *•' *^^ unique acyclic political equilibrium.
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Proof. See Appendix A. '. _
The intuition for this theorem is straightforward. When shocks are sufficiently infrequent, the
same calculus that applied in the nonstochastic environment still determines preferences because
all agents put most weight on the events that will happen before such a change. Consequently, a
stable government will arise and will remain in place until a stochastic shock arrives and changes
the configuration of competences. Following such a shock, the stable government for this new
configuration of competences emerges. Therefore, Theorem 3 provides us with a tractable way
of characterizing stochastic transitions. In the next subsection, we use this result to study the
links between difi'erent political regimes and institutional flexibility.
5.2 The Structure of Stochastic Transitions
In the rest of this section, we compare difi'erent political regimes in terms of their fiexibihty
(adaptability to stochastic shocks). Our main results will be that, even though a greater degree
of democracy does not guarantee the emergence of more competent governments in the non-
stochastic en^'ironment (nor does it guarantee greater expected competence), in the presence of
shocks institutional structures with a greater degree of democracy (less incumbency advantage)
wiU be more "flexible" ("will perform better in the long run"). In the results that follow, we
always impose Assumptions 1, 2', 3 and 4 (which again ensure uniqueness of acyclic political
equilibria).
We also impose some additional structure on the distribution F-p (Tq
\
T'q^) by assuming
that any shock corresponds to a rearrangement ( "permutation" ) of the abilities of different
individuals. Put differently, we assume throughout this subsection that there is a fixed vector
of abilities, say a = {ai,...,a„}, and the actual distribution of abilities across individuals at
time t. s 7j > , is given by some permutation tp^ of this vector a. We adopt the convention
that ai > a2 > ... > On. Intuitively, this captures the notion that a shock will change which
individual is best placed to solve certain tasks and thus most effective in government functions.
The next proposition shows the difference in flexibility implied by different political regimes.
Throughout the rest of this section, our measure of "flexibility" is the probability with which
the best government will be in power (either at given i or as £ ^ oo).'-'' More formally, let
Trt{l.k.n
\
G.{Tg}) be the probability that in a society with n indi^'iduals under a pohtical
regime characterized by I (for given fc), a conflguration of competence given by {Fg}, and current
government G G Q, the most competent government will be in power at the time t. Given n and
k, we will think of a regime characterized by I' as more flexible than one characterized by I if
This IS a natural metric of flexibility in the context of our model; since we have not introduced any cardinal
comparisons between the abilities of individuals, "expect competence" would not be a meaningful measure (see
also footnote 18). Note also that we would obtain similar results if we related flexibility to the probability that
one of the best two or three governments comes to power, etc.
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jTt {I', k,n \ G, {Tg}) > TTf {I, k,n\ G, {To}) for all G and {Tq} and for all t following a stochastic
shock. Similarly, we can think of the regime as asymptotically more flexible than another, if
limt—oo "{ {!', k,n \ G, {Fg}) > limt_oo T^t (h k,n\ G, {Fg}) for all G and {To} (provided that
these limits are well defined). Clearly, "being more flexible" is a partial order.
Proposition 4 l.lfl = (i.e., perfect democracy), then a shock immediately leads to the
replacement of the current government by the new most competent government.
2. If I = 1 (i.e., imperfect democracy), the competence of the government following a shock
never decreases further; instead, it increases with probability no less than
^
{k ~ ly. in - ky.
_
fn-r^"'^
[n-iy \k-i,
Starting with any G and {To}, the probability that the most competent government will
ultimately come to power as a result of a shock is ' , •' '
n — k\ /n^
lim7Tt{Lk,n\G,{TG})^7ril,k,n) = l- t ^ 1 ( J < 1.
For fixed k as n ^ oo, tt (/, /c, n) —> 0.
'
' "'.'''"
3. If I = k > 2 (i.e., extreme dictatorship), then a shock never leads to a change in govern-
ment. The probability that the most competent government is in power at any given period
(any t) after the shock is . ,
TTf (/ := /c,/c,n
I
,•) = f
^
This probability is strictly less than iTf (l = 0,k,n \ G, {Tg}) and tt; (/ = 1, k, n \ G, {Tg})
for any G and {Tg}.
Proof. See Appendix A. "
Proposition 4 contains a number of important results. A perfect democracy {I = 0) does not
create any barriers against the installation of the best government at anj^ point in time. Hence,
under a perfect democracy every shock is "flexibly" met by a change in government according to
the wishes of the population at large (which here means that the most competent government
will come to power). As we know from the analysis in Section 4, this is no longer true as
soon as members of the governments have incuinbency advantage. In particular, we know that
without stochastic shocks, arbitrarily incompetent governments may come to power and remain
in power. However, in the presence of shocks the evolution of equilibrium governments becomes
more complex.
Next consider the case with / > 1. Now, even though the immediate effect of a shock may be
a deterioration in govermnent competence, there are forces that increase government competence
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in the long run. This is most clearl)' illustrated in the case where 1=1. With this set of political
institutions, there is zero probability that there will be a further decrease in government compe-
tence following a shock. Moreover, there is a positive probability that competence will improve
and in fact a positive probability that, following a shock, the most competent government will
be instituted. In particular, a shock may make the current government unstable, and in this
case, there will be a transition to a new stable govermnent. A transition to a less competent
government would never receive support from the population. The change in competences may
be such that the only stable government after the shock, starting with the current government,
may be the best government.^' Proposition 4 also shows that when political institutions take the
form of an extreme dictatorship, there will never be any transition, thus the current government
can deteriorate following shocks (in fact, it can do so significantly).
Most importantly, part 3 of Proposition 4 shows that imperfect democracy has a higher
degree of flexibility than dictatorship, ensuring better long-run outcomes (and naturally perfect
democracy has the highest degree of flexibility). This unambiguous ranking between imperfect
democracy and dictatorship in the presence of stochastic shocks (and its stronger version stated
in the next proposition) contrasts with the results in Section 4, which showed that general
comparisons between imperfect democracy and dictatorship are not possible in the nonstochastic
case. Thus, a distinct advantage of more democratic regimes might be their flexibility in the
face of changing environments.
An informal intuition for the greater flexibility of more democratic regimes in the presence
of stochastic shocks can be obtained from Examples 5 and 6 in the previous section. Recall
from these examples that an advantage of the less democratic regime, Z = 2, is that the presence
of two veto players makes a large number of governments near the initial one stable. But this
imphes that if the initial govermuent is destabilized because of a shock, there will only be a
move to a nearby government. In contrast, the more democratic regime, 1 = 1, often makes
highly incompetent governments stable because there are no nearby stable governments (recall,
for example, part 2 of Proposition 3). But this also implies that if a shock destabilizes the
current government, a significant improvement in the quality of the government becomes more
hkel}'. Thus, at a broad level, regimes with lower degrees of democracy "create more stability,"
facihtating small or moderate-sized improvements in initial government quality, but do not
create a large "basin of attraction'' for the highest competence governments (in particular, the
best government). In contrast, in regimes with higher degrees of democracy, low competence
governments are often made stable by the instability of nearby alternative governments; this
instability can be a disadvantage in deterministic environments as illustrated in the previous
' Nevertheless, the probabiUty of the most competent government coming to power, though positive, may be
arbitrarily low.
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section, but turns into a significant flexibility advantage in the presence of stochastic shocks
because it creates the possibihty that, after a shoclv, there may be a jump to a very high
competence government (in particular, to the best government, which now has a larger "basin
of attraction" than in less democratic regimes).
The next proposition strengthens the conclusions of Proposition 4. In particular, it estab-
lishes that the probability of having the most competent goverrunent in power is increasing in
the degree of democracy more generally (i.e., it is decreasing in l)}^
Proposition 5 The probability of having the most competent government in power after a shock
(for any t), lit {l,k,n
j
G, {Tg}), is decreasing in I for any k, n, G and {Tc}. That is, more
democratic regimes are more likely to produce the most competent government.
Proof. See Appendix A. - . ' -
The results of Propositions 4 and 5 can be strengthened further, when shocks are "limited"
in the sense that only the abilities of two (or in the second part of the proposition, of x > 2)
individuals in the society are swapped. The next proposition contains these results.
Proposition 6 Suppose that any shock permutes the abilities of x individuals in the society.
1. If X = 2 (so that the abilities of two individuals are swapped at a time) and I < k —
1, then the competence of the government in power is nondecreasing over time, that is,
TTt {I, k,n
\
G, {Tc}) is nondecreasing in t for any I, k, n, G and {Tg} such that I < k — I.
Moreover, if the probability of swapping of abilities between any two individuals is positive,
then the most competent government will be in power as t ^> oo with probability I, that is,
limt_,oo "f {l,k,n \ G, {Tg}) = 1 (for any I. k, n, G and {Tg} such that I < k — I).
2. If X > 2, then the results in part 1 hold provided that I <k — \x/2\. ..
Proof. See Appendix A.
An interesting application of Proposition 6 is that when shocks are (relatively) rare and
limited in their scope, relatively democratic regimes will gradually improve over time and install
the most competent government in the long run. This is not true for the most autocratic
governments, however. This proposition, therefore, strengthens the conclusions of Propositions
4 and 5 in highlighting the flexibility benefits of more democratic regimes.
This conclusion need not be true for "expected competence" of the government, since we have not made
"cardinal" assumptions on abilities. In particular, it is possible that some player is not a member of any stable
government for some I and becomes part of a stable government for some I' < /. If this player has very low
ability, then expected competence under V may be lower. In Appendix B, we provide an example (Example 10)
illustrating this point, and we also show that expected competence of government is monotone in I when I is close
to or to k.
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The political institutions considered so far are "junta-like" in the sense that no specific
member is indispensable. Incumbencj' advantage takes the form of the requirement that some
members of the current government must consent to change. The alternative is a "royaltj^-like"
environment where one or several members of the govermnent are irreplaceable. All else equal,
this can be conjectured to be a negative force, since it would mean that a potentially low ability
person must alwa^-s be part of the government. However, because such an irreplaceable meniber
(the member of the "roj'alty") is also unafraid of changes, better governments may be more
likely to arise under certain circumstances, whereas, as we have seen, junta members would
resist certain changes because of the further transitions that these will unleash.
More formally, we change Assumption 2 and the structure of the set of winning coalitions
Wg to accommodate "royalty-like" situations. We assume that there are / royalty individuals
whose votes are always necessary for a transition to be implemented (regardless of whether they
are current government members). We denote the set of these individuals by Y. So, the new set
of winning coalitions becomes
Wg = {X e C : |.Y[ > m and Y C A'} .
We also assume that all royal individuals are members of the initial government, that is, Y C G°.
The next proposition characterizes the structure of equilibrium in this Ccise and compares royalty-
like and junta-like institutions in terms of the expected competence of the equilibrium (stable)
go\'ernment
.
Proposition 7 Suppose that we have a royalty-systern with 1 < I < k and cornpetences of
governments are given by (10). so that the I royals are never removed from, the govem.ment.
// {ai, ..., a„} is sufficiently "convex" meaning that °'~°^ is sufficiently large, then the expected
competence of the government under the royalty system, is greater than under the original, junta-
like system, (with the same I). The opposite conclusion holds if
°^~°"~^
is sufficiently low and
1 = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 7 shows that royalty-like regimes perform better in the face of shocks than
junta-like regimes in terms of generating higher expected competence governments, provided
that {ai,...,a„} is highly "convex" (such convexity implies that the benefit to society from
having the highest ability indiAddual in government is relatively high). As discussed above,
juntas are unlikely to lead to such high quality governments because of the fear of a change
leading to a fmther round of changes, excluding all initial members of the junta. Royalty-
like regimes avoid this fear. Nevertheless, royalty-like regimes have a disad\'antage in that the
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ability of royals may be verj' low or may change at some point and become very low, and the
royals will always be part of the government. In this sense, royalty-like regimes create a clear
disadvantage. However, this result shows that when {ai, ...,a„} is sufficiently convex (so as to
outweigh the loss of expected competence because of the presence of a potentially low ability
royal), expected competence is nonetheless higher under the royaltj'-like system. This result is
interesting because it suggests that different types of dictatorships may have distinct implications
for long-run quality of government and performance, and regimes that provide security to certain
members of the incumbent government may be better at dealing with changes and in ensuring
relatively high-quality governments in the long run.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a tractable dynamic model of political selection. The main barrier
to the selection of good politicians and to the formation of good governments in our model is
not the difficulty of identifying competent or honest pohticians, but the incumbency advantage
of current governments. Our framework shows how a small degree of incumbency advantage
can lead to the persistence of highly inefficient and incompetent governments. This is because
incumbency advantage implies that one of (potentially many) members of the government needs
to consent to a change in the composition of government. However, all current members of the
go\'ernment may recognize that any change may unleash a further round of changes, ultimately
im.seating themselves. In this case, they will all oppose any change in government, even if such
changes can improve welfare significantly for the rest of the society, and highly incompetent
governments can remain in power. ; :
,
,
-
Using this framework, we studj' the implications of different political institutions for the se-
lection of governments both in nonstochastic and stochastic environments. A perfect democracy
corresponds to a situation in which there is no incumbency advantage, thus citizens can nomi-
nate alternative governments and vote them to power without the need for the consent of any
member of the incumbent government. In this case, we show that the most competent govern-
ment will always come to power. However, interestingly, any deviation from perfect democracy
breaks this result and the long-run equilibrium government can be arbitrarily incompetent (rel-
ative to the best possible government). In extreme dictatorship, where any single member of
the current government has a veto power on any change, the initial government alwa5's remains
in power and this can be arbitrarily costly for the societ}'. More surprisingly, the same is true
for anj' political institution other than perfect democracy. Moreover, there is no obvious rank-
ing between different sets of political institutions (other than perfect democracy and extreme
dictatorship) in terms of what they will imply for the quality of long run government. In fact.
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regimes with lower degrees of democrac}' (greater incumbency advantage) can lead to higher
quality governments both in specific instances and in expectation (with uniform or non-uniform
distribution over the set of feasible initial governments). Even though no such ranking across
pohtical institutions is possible, we provide a fairly tight characterization of the structure of
stable governments in our benchmark nonstochastic society.
In contrast, in stochastic environments, more democratic pohtical regimes have a distinct
advantage because of their greater "fiexibiUtj'" . In particular, in stochastic environments, ei-
ther the abilities and competences of individuals or the needs of government functions change,
shuffling the ranking of different possible governments in terms of their competences and ef-
fectiveness. A greater degree of democracy then ensures greater "adaptability" or flexibility.
Perfect democracy is most flexible and immediately adjusts to any shock by installing a new
government that has the greatest competence after the shock. Extreme dictatorship is the polar
opposite and again leads to no change in the initial government. Therefore, shocks that reduce
the competence of the individuals currently in power can lead to significant deterioration in the
quality of government. Most interestingly, more democratic political institutions allow a greater
degree of institutional flexibility in response to shocks. In particular, we show that shocks can-
not lead to the emergence of a worse government (relative to the competence of the government
in power following the shock). They may, however, destabilize the current government and
induce the emergence of a more competent government. We show that political institutions
with a greater degree of democracy have higher probability of improving the competence of the
government following a shock and ultimately instalhng the most competent government.
Finally, we also compare "junta-like" and "royalty-like" regimes. The former is our bench-
mark society, where change in government requires the consent or support of one or multiple
members of the current government. The second corresponds to situations in which one or
multiple individuals are special and must always be part of the government (hence the title
"royalty"). If royal individuals have low ability, royalty-like regimes can lead to the persistence
of highly incompetent governments. However, we also show that in stochastic environments,
royalty-like regimes ma}' lead to the emergence of liigher qualit)' governments in the long run
than junta-like regimes. This is because roj^al individuals are not afraid of changes in govern-
ments, because their powers are absolute. In contrast, members of the junta may resist changes
that may increase goA-ernment competence or quality because such changes may lead to another
round of changes, ultimately excluding all members of the initial government.
An important contribution of our paper is to provide a tractable framework for the dynamic
analysis of the selection of politicians. This tractability makes it possible to extend the analysis
in various fruitful directions. For example, it is possible to introduce conflict of interest among
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voters, for example, by having each government be represented by two characteristics: compe-
tence and ideological leaning. In this case, not all voters will simply prefer the most competent
government. The general approach developed here remains applicable in this case. Another
generahzation would allow the strength of the preferences of voters towards a particular govern-
ment to influence the number of veto players, so that a transition away from a semi-incompetent
government can be blocked bj' a few insiders, but more unified opposition from government
members would be necessary to block a transition away from a highly incompetent government.
An open question, which would be interesting to investigate perhaps by placing more struc-
ture on preferences and institutions, is the characterization of equilibria in the stochastic envi-
ronment when shocks occur frequently. This case introduces a number of nontrivial technical
difficulties, and even existence of pure strategy equilibria becomes difficult to guarantee.
The most important direction for future research, which is again feasible using the general
approach here, is an extension of this framework to incorporate the asymmetric information
issues emphasized in the previous literature. For example, we can generalize the environment
in this paper such that the ability of an individual is not observed until she becomes part
of the government. In this case, to install liigh quality governments, it is necessary to first
"experiment" with different types of governments. The dynamic interactions highlighted by our
analysis will then become a barrier to such experimentation. In this case, the set of political
institutions that will ensure high quality governments must exhibit a different type of flexibility,
whereby some degree of "churning" of governments can be guaranteed even without shocks.
Another interesting area is to introduce additional instruments, so that some political regimes
can provide incentives to pohticians to take actions in line with the interests of the society at
large. In that case, successful political institutions must ensure both the selection of high ability
individuals and the provision of incentives to these individuals once they are in government.
Finally, as hinted by the discussion in this paragraph, an interesting and challenging extension is
to develop a more general "mechanism design" approach in this context, whereby certain aspects
of political institutions are designed to facilitate the appropriate future changes in government.
We view these directions as interesting and important areas for future research.
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Appendix A
In the appendix, we use the following notation. First, we introduce the following binary relation
on the set of feasible governments Q. For any G, H E Q we write
H yGii&nd only a {ie I: w,{H)>Wi{G)} eWo- (Al)
In other words, H > G \i and only if there exists a winning coalition in G such that all members
of G have higher stage payoff in H than in G. Let us also define set D as
V = {GeG:(j>{G) = G].
The next two lemmas summarize the properties of payoff fimctions and mapping (j).
Lemma 1 Suppose that G.H (E G and To > F//. Then:
1. If for i e I, w, (G) < w^ [H], then i£H\G.
2. H ^G.
3. i{2 e I : w, (G) > u), [E)}\ > n/2 > k.
Proof of Lemma 1. Part 1. If Fg > F/f then, by Assumption 1, Wj (G) > w, (H) whenever
i E G or i ^ H. Hence, u;; (G) < w, [H) is possible only ii i € H\G (note that Wi (G) = U', (H)
is ruled out by Assumption 3). At the same time, i e H \ G implies ib\ (G) < Wi [H) by
Assumption 1. hence the equivalence.
Part 2. We have \H \G\ < \H\ < k < mo; since by Assumption 2 fc < mo, then H \G ^
Wg, and H ^ G by definition (Al).
Pai-t 3. We have {i G I : w^ (G) > w, {H)} = I \ {i € I : w, (G) < w, {H)} D I \ {H \ G),
hence, \{i e I : w^ (G) > w^ {H)]\ >n-k>n-n/2 = n/2 > L
Lemma 2 Consider the mapping cp defined in (6) and letG,H€G. Then:
1. Either cp{G)=G (and then G eV) or 4, (G) >- G.
2. V^(G) > Tg-
3. If(p{G) >- G and H >- G. then T^^Q) > ^H-
4. (/>((/.(G)) = 0(G).
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Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of this lemma is straightforward and is omitted.
Proof of Theorem 1. As in the text, let us enumerate elements of Q as {Gi, G2. ..., G\g\ }
such that Fg^ > Tcy whenever x < y. First, we prove that the function (p defined in (6)
constitutes a (Markov) political equilibrium. Take any Gq, I <q < \G\- By (6), either cpiGg) =
Gq or (f>{Gq) £ M.q. In the latter case, the set of plaj^ers who obtain higher stage payoff under
(p{Gq) than under Gq (i.e., those with Wi {(p{Gq) > Wi (Gq))) form a winning coalition in Gq by
(5). Since by definition (p (Gq) is 0-stable, we have Vj {4> {Gq)) > Vt (Gq) for a winning coalition
of players. Hence, in either case condition (i) of Definition 1 is satisfied.
Now, suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that condition (ii) of Definition 1 is violated, and
X,Y e Wg^ are winning coalitions such that V,{H) > Wi {Gq) / {I - /3) for all i G X and
Vi {H) > Vi {4>[Gq)) for all i G y and some alternative H £ Q. Consider first the case F^///) y^
^^(G,)! t^tien Vi{H) > Vi{cp{Gq)) would imply Wi{d){H)) > Wi{(p{Gq)) as p is close to 1, and
hence the set of players who have Wi {4> [H)) > Wi [4> {Gq)) would include Y , and thus would be
a winning coalition in Gq. This is impossible if F^j^/) < T^i^q
j
(only players in 4> {H) would
possibly prefer (p{H), and they are less than mCg)- If ^q,{H} > ^ci>(G )> however, we would get
a government <p {H) which is (p-stable by construction of cp and which is preferred to Gq by at
least mc, players (all except perhaps members of Gq) and at least Iq members of Gq (indeed,
at least Iq members of Gq - those in coalition A' - had Vj {4> {H)) > w^ {Gq) / (1 — /?), which
then means they belong to (p {H), and hence must have Wi {cp {H)) > Wj {Gq)) as (p> {H) is stable
and r^i^Gg) > Tg,- This would imply that (p{H) G Mq by (5), but in that case r^(^H) > ^4>{Gg)
would contradict (6). .
Finally, consider the case
^q,{H) = ^(h{G )> which by Assumption 3 implies cp{H) = (p{Gq).
Now Vi {H) > Vi {cp {Gq)) impUes Wi {H) > Wi {cp {Gq)) for all i G 1', as the instantaneous utilities
are the same except for the current period. Since this includes at least viq^ players, we must
have that F// > F^(g,). But T^^h) > Th by (6), so T^^h) >'^h> r^iG,)- which contradicts
'^(i>(H) = r^(G )• This contradiction proves that mapping 156 satisfies both conditions of Definition
1, and thus forms a political equilibrium.
To prove uniqueness, suppose that there is another acychc political equilibrium ip. For each
G £ Q, define x{G) = tp {G); due to acycUcity, x{G) is ^'-stable for all G. We prove the
following sequence of claims. First, we must have that F^(G) ^ Tg; indeed, otherwise condition
(i) of Definition 1 would not be satisfied for large /?.
Second, we prove that all transitions must take place in one step, i.e., x {G) = ip {G) for
all G. If this were not the case, then, due to finiteness of any chain of transitions there would
exist G eg such that ip (G) 7^ x {G) but ip'^ (G) = x (G). Take H = x {G). Then F^ > F^(G),
Th > Fg and ip {H) = H. For /? sufficiently close to 1, the condition Vi {H) > Wi {G) / (1 — /3) is
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automatically satisfied for the winning coalition of players who had V-j {(p (G)) > Wi (G) / (1 — /?).
We next prove that Vi [H) > Vi {(f) (G)) for a winning coalition of players in G. Note that this
condition is equivalent to Wi {H) > Wi {(p{G)). The fact that at least mc players prefer H to
(p{G) follows from Fh > F^f^). Moreover, since x (G) = H, at least Iq members of G must also
be members of H; naturally', they prefer H to (p (G). Consequently, condition (ii) of Definition
1 is violated. This contradiction proves that x (G) = ip (G) for all G.
Finally, we prove that tl' {G) coincides with (p{G) defined in (6). Suppose not, i.e., that
(p{G) r" i'{G). Without loss of generality, we may assume that G is the most competent
government that has (p{G) / ip{G), i.e., 4>{H) = ip{H) whenever Th > ^G- By Assmuption
3, we have that F^^c) ¥" r^(G)- Suppose that ^^,^G) > r^(G) (the case r^,^) < r^(G) is
treated similarly). As li-' {G) forms a political equihbrium, it must satisfy condition (ii) of
Definition 1, for if = (G) in particular. Since cp {G) is a pohtical equilibrium, it must be that
Wi {(p{G]) > ib'i (G), and thus Vi {H \ cp) > w, (G) / (1 — 3), for a winning coaUtion of players.
Now, we see that the following two facts must hold. First, V, {H
j V) > w^ (G) / (1 — /9) for a
winning coahtion of players: this follows from the fact that H is (p-st&h\e and thus i/'-stable as
Th > Fg and fi-om the choice of G. Second, ]/, {H \ it') > Vi (•!/' (G) | ip) for a winning coahtion
of players; indeed, H and )/' (G) are 0-stable, and the former is preferred to the latter (in terms
of states payoffs) by at least mc players and at least Ig government members, as ^^{G] > Fi/.(g)
and the intersection of H and G contains at least Iq members (since H = cp (G)). The existence
of such H leads to a contradiction which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. Part 1. We prove the statement for the case I = 0. The case / > 1
is covered bj' Part 2 of the theorem.
To obtain a contradiction, suppose that there is a cycle: this imphes that so that there
are g > 2 different governments Hi, .... Hg such that d>{Hj) = //j+i for all 1 < j < q, and
(b{Hq) = Hi. Without loss of generality, let Hi be the least competent of these governments.
Take H = 4>{H2} (if g > 2 then H = Hj, and if g = 2 then H = Hi). As (p is a political
equilibrium, V^ (H) > V {H2) holds for a winning coalition in ffo- But winning coahtions are
the same for all governments, so V, [H) > V {H2) holds for a winning coahtion in Hi. Moreover,
by Assumption 1, V^ [H) > w, [Hi] / (1 - /?) for all pla3'ers except, perhaps, members of Hi (as
Hi is the least competent government). However, the existence of such alternative H contradicts
that <p is a political equilibrium, as the condition (ii) of Definition 1 is violated for government
Hi. This contradiction completes the proof.
Part 2. Suppose to obtain a contradiction that there is a cycle, so that there are q > 2
different governments Hi, . . . ,Hq such that 4>{Hj) = H-j+i for all 1 < j < q, and (f>{Hq) = Hi.
Without loss of generality, let Hi be the most competent of these governments. Take any
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i E Hi. In that case, Vi {Hi) > Vi {H2), as player i gets the highest utihty under Hi (formally,
we have Vi {H2) < Wi [Hi) / (1 — /?) as Hi is i's most preferred government in the cycle, hence
Wi {Hi) + pVi {H2) > Vi {H2), which means V, {Hi) > V, (i?2))- Since this holds for all members
of Hi and ///^ > 1, it is impossible that for a winning coalition of players in Hi the condition
Vi {H2) > Vi {Hi) is satisfied. This contradiction completes the proof.
Part 3. Suppose to obtain a contradiction that the statement does not hold. As the
number of mappings Q —^ G is finite, there exists mapping d) which forms a cyclic political
equilibrium for /? arbitrarily close to 1. Moreover, since the number of coalitions is finite, we
can only consider (3 in which (p is supported by the same coalitions in players. Let Hi, . .
.
, Hq
with q > 2 satisfs' 'P{Hj) = -^j + i for all 1 ^ i < 9 and 4>{Hq) = Hi, so that the sequence
constitutes a cycle for 0. This means, in particular, that for any G € {Hi,. . . ,Hq], the inequality
Vi {4>{G)
\
4),13) > Vi{G \ (p,P) is satisfied for the same winning coalition of players for some /3
arbitrarily close to 1. As this inequality is equivalent to Wi {G) < (1 — /?) Vi {(p{G) | 0, /?), we
must have (by taking the limit as /? ^ 1) that
Wi (G) <Ui = -'^Wj {Hp)
,
where the last the quality defines Ui. -
Without loss of generality, suppose that H2 is the least competent of the governments in the
cycle. Consider first the case q = 2. We must have that , ,.
and hence w^ {Hi) < Wi {Ho), for a winning coalition of players in Hi. However, only members
of H2 may satisfy these inequalities, and their number is less than vih-^ We get an immediate
contradiction.
Consider now the more complicated case (? > 3. In this case, Hi,H2,H'i are three different
governments. We take H = H^ and show that the condition (ii) of Definition 1 is violated
for current government Hi and alternative H = H^. In particular, we need to check that the
following two conditions are satisfied:
"
.
1. Vi {H3) > Vi {H2) for a winning coalition of players. Note that this is equivalent to
Wi {H2) < Vj (i/3). The latter is satisfied for sufficiently large /3 provided that Wi {H2) < Ui.
This last inequality holds for aU players except, perhaps, members of i/o, i.e., for at least
7n//j of them. Therefore, we just have to prove that Wi {Ho) < u, for at least Ifj^ members
of Hi. However, we know that Wi{Hi) < Ui for at least Ifi^ members of Hi. More-
over, since they belong to Hi and Fj/j < ^Hi, we must have that u-'j {H2) < Wi {Hi] by
Assumption 1 for each of these players. But this immediately implies u'i{H2) < Ui.
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2. Vi (Hs) > w, (Hi) / (1 — /?) for a winning coalition of players. Suppose not; then there
must exist player i such that (1 — /3) V,, {H^) < u), (Hi) < {I — (3) Vi (Ho) (since the latter
inequality holds for a winning coalition of players). Taking the limit, we get u, < un (Hi) <
Ui, and hence w, (Hi) = u,. However, this contradicts the assumption.
Consequently, we found H = H^ for which the condition (ii) of Definition 1 is violated. This
contradiction completes the proof.
Part 4. The proof of this part follows the proof of Part 3, except the steps im^olved in
checking the condition Vi (H^) > Wi (Hi) / (1 — /?) for a winning coahtion of players (indeed,
it is only in this step that the assumption in Part 3 was used). To check that last condition,
again suppose that it did not hold. Then there must exist player i such that (1 - P) V, (i^s) <
Wi {Hi) < (1 — /3) Vi [Ho) (since the latter inequahty holds for a winning coalition of players).
Taking the limit, we get u, < w, [Hi) < u,, and hence w, (Hi) = u,. Given the assumption,
this is only possible if player i is either a member of all go\'ernments Hi. . . . ,Hq or a member
of none of them (otherwise Wi [Hi) > u^ if i G Hi and w^ (Hi) < u, if i ^ Hi). In both cases,
IV, {H2) < w, (Hi), and thus w, {Hn) < u,. But then V; (i/3) > V, {H2) if is sufficiently close to
1. This contradicts the double inequality above, which proves that Vj {H^) > w, {Hi) / {1 — j3)
for a winning coalition.
Consequently, we found H = H^ for which the condition (ii) of Definition 1 is violated. This
contradiction completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. Part 1. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that \G (1 H\ > I,
but G ^ H. By Assumption 3 we need to have 7(^ < 7/^ or ^'q >
-)fj\ w-ithout loss of generahty,
assume the former. Then i^ ;^ G by Lemma 1, since \G r\H\ > I. Note that G — Gq for some
q and H = Gj for some j such that j < q. Since H is stable, (p {Gj) = Gj, but then Mq 7^
by (5), and so (t){Gq) 7^ Gq, as follows from (6). However, this contradicts the hypothesis that
Gq = G € V, and thus completes the proof.
Part 2. By definition of mapping (p, 4> (Gi) = Gi, so Gi e P. Take any government G £ P;
since |G n Gij > = /, we have G = Gi by part 1. Consequently, V = {Gi], so P is a singleton.
Now, for any G, 6 (G) e P, and thus 4){G) = Gi.
Pai-t 3. As before, the most competent government, Gi, is stable, i.e. Gi £ P. Now consider
the set of governments which intersect with Gi by fewer than / members:
B = {Ge^:lGnGi| </}.
This set is non-empty, because n > 2/c implies that there exists a government which does not
intersect with G\\ obviously, it is in B. Now take the most competent government from B, Gj
37
where
j =mm{q:l <q < \G\ and Gg E B}
.
We have Gj j^ Gi, because Gi ^ B. Let us show that Gj is stable. Note that any government
Gq such that 7(^ > Jq . does not belong to B and therefore has at least / common members with
stable government Gi. Hence, (j^iGq) = Gi (see (6)), and therefore Gq is unstable, except for
the case g = 1. Now we observe that set Mj is empty: for each government Gq with 1 < q < j
either the first condition in (8) is violated (if g = 1) or the second one (otherwise). But this
implies that (p{G^) = Gj, so Gj is stable. This proves that if I > I, V contains at least two
elements. Finally, note that this boundary is achieved: for example, if / = 1 and n < 3k.
Part 4. If / = k, then for any Gq S Q, it is impossible that H y Gq for some alternative
H y^ Gq, as there will exist player i E Gq\ H ioi whom Wi (H) < Wi [Gq). Hence, Mq =
for all q, and thus 4>{Gq) — Gq by (6). Consequently, C = ^, and this completes the proof of
Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Part 1. We prove the more general part 2, then the statement
of part 1 will be a corollary: to obtain (11), one only needs to substitute x = k into (12).
Part 2. Let us prove the existence of such stable government. Define a set-^'alued function
X:C' ^C'^-'u{0} by
.. ^,o.\ G\S ifGeDandScG;
'^^
' \ if there exists no G 6 D such that S CG. ^ '
In v/ords, for any coalition of / individuals, function x assigns a coalition oi k — I individuals
such that their union is a stable government whenever such other coalition exists or an empty
set when it does not exist. Note that x (S) is a well defined single valued function: indeed, there
carmot be two different stable governments G and H which contain 5, for this would violate
Proposition 1 (part 1), as they intersect by at least / members from S.
Let y;_i be some coalition of / — I individuals such that ATil/_i = 0; denote these individuals
by ii,. . . ,ii-i. We will now add /c - / + 1 individuals ii,. . . ,ik to this coaUtion one by one and
we wiU denote the intermediate coalitions by Yi, . . . ,Yk, and then prove that Y^ satisfies the
requirements. Let X;_i = X , and let
X, = (XUl;_i)ufu,Y(^;-iU{i})J. - ;, (A3)
Intuitively, we take the set of individuals which are either forbidden to join the government under
construction by our requirements (A') or are already there {Yi^i), and add all individuals which
can be in the same government with all individuals from l;_i and at least one individual from
A'(_i = A'. Now take some individual ii E I \ A'; (below we show that such individual exists)
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and let Y] — Y(_i U {i;}. At each subsequent step z, I + 1 < z < k, we choose zth individual for
the government under construction as follows. We first define
and then take
i, eI\X, (A5)
(we prove that we can do that later) and denote Y^ = Y^-i U {u}. Let the last government
obtained in this way be denoted by Y = Y'k.
We now show that (p{Y} Ci X = 0. Suppose not, then there is individual i e (1>{Y) n X.
By (6) we must have that \(t>{Y) nY\ > I; take the individual ij with the highest j of such
individuals. Clearly, j > I, so individual ij could not be a member of the initial Yi-i and was
added at a later stage. Now let S" be a subset of (0 [Y] n Y) \ {ij} such that |5t = / — 1. Since
go\'ernment (p (Y) is stable and contains the entire S as well as i (E X (and i ^ S because S C Y
and A' n 1' = 0), we must have \ (5 U {i}) = (p (V). Consequentl)', if we consider the right-hand
side of (A4) for ~ = j, we will immediately get that </> (F) c A'^-, and therefore ij £ A'j. But we
picked ij such that ij t T\Xj, according to (A5). We get to a contradiction, wliich proves that
(i> (Y) n A' — 0, so (p [Y) is a stable government which contains no member of A^.
It remains to show that we can always pick such individual; we need to show that the
number of individuals in A'; is less than n for any z : I < z < k. Note that the union in the inner
parentheses of (A4) consists of at most
individuals, while z — I < k — 1. Therefore, it is sufficient to require that
n > x + k-l + {k-l)( ]x
= x + /.-l+.(.-/) J^li^.
Because we are dealing with integers, this implies (12), which completes the proof.
Part 3. This follows immediately by using Assumption 4 and setting p = x in (12), which
gives (13).
Proof of Proposition 3. Part 1. By Assumption 2, < / < /c, so either / = or / = 1. If
/ = 0, then Proposition 1 (part 2) implies that the only stable government is Gi, so cp (G) = Gi
for all G € Q, where Gi = {ii}. If / = 1, then Proposition 1 (part 4) implies that any G is
stable.
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Part 2. In this case, either / = 0, / = 1, or / = 2. If Z = or ^ = 2, the proof is similar to
that of part 1 and foUows from Proposition 1 (parts 2 and 4). li I = I, then {11,12} is the most
competent, and hence stable, government. By 1 (part 1), any other government containing ii or
12 is unstable. Hence, {13,14}, the most competent government not containing ii or 12, is stable.
Proceeding hkewise, we find that the only stable governments are {i2j-i, i2j} foi' 1 < j < '^72.
By the construction of mapping cp, either cp (G) = G or [^ [G] r\G\ = I. If G = {ia, h} with
a < b, then cp (G) will include either ia or ifc. Now it is evident that cf) (G) will be the stable
state which includes ia, because it is more competent than the one which includes 15 if the latter
exists and is different.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof follows immediately from Theorem 1 and the assumption
that changes are sufficiently infrequent. Indeed, in the latter case, all the strict inequalities in
Definitions 1 and 2 are preserved.
Proof of Proposition 4. Part 1. If / = 0, then by Proposition 1 for any G, 0* (G) = G\,
where G\ is the most competent government {^i, • • , i]i.}.
Part 2. Suppose / = 1, then Proposition 1 provides a full characterization. There are
[n/k\ < n/k stable governments. Each consists of k individuals, so the probabihty that a random
new government coincides with any given stable government is l/(^) = ' "
,
. The probability
that it coincides with any stable government is [n/k\ /(^) < ^ '^7 = "~(„_i)T = ^/(fcZi)-
The government will change to a more competent one if and only if it is unstable, which happens
with probabihty greater than or equal to 1 — l/()!lj). - ." ^ ';
The most competent government will be installed if and only if after the shock, the govern-
ment contains at least 1 of the k most competent members. The probability that it does not
contain any of these equals ("^^
")/(]!) (this is the number of combinations that do not include
k most competent members divided by the total number of combinations). We have
(n- ky.kl [n --k\)
k\ (n-2/c)! n!
(n--k)\ (n- k\)
(n- 2ky. n I
TJ' n
- k- J
-'-'-7=1 n — j
Since each of the k factors tends to 1 as n —> 00, so does the product. Hence, the probabihty
that the most competent government wiU arise, lit (l,k,n
j
G, {Fg}) = 1 — ("^
')/(fc)' tends to
as n ^ oc.
Part 3. If / = k, then (p^ (G) = G for any t and G. Hence, the government will not
change. It will be the most competent if it contains k most competent individuals, which hap-
pens with probabihty l/(^)- This is less than 1, which is the corresponding probability for
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/ = 0, so TTt {I = k,k,n\ G, {Tg}) < tt^ (/ = 0, fc, n | G, {To})- If fc > 2, it is also less than
the corresponding probability for 1=1: in the latter case, there are at least two govern-
ments which will lead to the most competent one: {i\, ,i\} and {*!, • • , ifc_i, 'ij^+i}, i.e.,
TTt {I = 0,k,n
I
G,{rG}) > 2/(^) > 7rt(/ = 0,/c,n I G,{Tg}). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. Given the specific changes in {To} in this case, the probability
of ha\-ing the most competent government G\ (for any initial G and {Fg}) is the probability
that at least / members of G' are members of G\ . This probability equals (from hypergeometric
distribution):
n{l,k,n\G,{TG}) eU iU)
and is strictly decreasing in /,
Proof of Proposition 6. Part 1. Any such swapping (or, more generallj', any transposition
a. where a (i) is the indi\'idual whose former competence individual i now has) induces a one-to-
one mapping that maps government G to government p (G): i £ p (G) if and only if a {i) G G.
B}' construction, F^ = r*,^,, and, by construction of mapping 0. <£'*"' (G) = 0* {p{G}) for all
G. If all transitions occur in one stage, and a shock triggers a period of instability, then with
probability 1 all shocks arrive at times t where government G*""' is (i)'~''^-stable.
If abilities of only two individuals are swapped, then \Gr]p{G)\ > /c — 1 > /. But G is
(^'"^-stable with probability 1, hence, p{G) is (;/)^-stable. Consider two cases. If F^ > F',^,,
then F',,^, > F!- > F*,^,. If F^ < F' ^,. then again r*,,„, > F*,^,, since there is a rf)*-
<p'{G) — G — p{G) G p(G)- b <p'{G) — P[G)
Stable government p (G) which has with G at least / common members and the competence
of which is F'^^^,. Hence, cj)^ (G) is either p{G) or a more competent government. Hence, the
competence of government cannot decrease. However, it may increase, unless G contains k most
competent members. Indeed, in that case there exist z,j £ T with i < j such that i ^ G and
j e G. Obviously, swapping the abilities of these individuals increases the competence of G:
F^ > F^ , and thus the stable government that will e\'oh'e will satisfy '^\iq:. > F^ > T^q .
Since the probability of this swapping is non-zero, eventually the competence of government will
improve. Since there is a finite number of possible values of current government's competence,
then with probability 1 the most competent government will emerge.
Part 2. Tills follows from an argument of part 1, taking into account that if abilities of
X individuals changed, then \Gr\p[G)\ > k - [x/2J > I. Indeed, if \Gr\p{G)\ < k- [x/2\,
we would have \G (1 p {G)\ < k — [(i + 1) /2J since the numbers of both sides are integers, and
thus \{G\p (G)) U (p (G) \ G)| > 2 [{x + 1) /2J > x. However, aU individuals in (G \ p (G)) U
{p(G)\G) changed their abilities, so the last inequality contradicts the assumption that no
more than x individuals did. This contradiction completes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 7. The probability of having the most able player in the government
under the royalty system is 1. Indeed, government (/>* (G*) will for any t and any G* consist of
I irreplaceable members and k — I most competent members. Since I < k, this always includes
the most competent player. In the case of a junta-Uke system, there is a positive probability
that a goverrmient that does not include player i\ is stable. If °'~°^ is sufficiently large, any
government that includes player i\ is more competent that a government that does not. The
first part follows. Now consider the probability that the least competent player, i^, is a part of
the government. In a royalty system, this can happen if and only if the irreplaceable member is
the least competent, i.e., with probability 1/n. In a junta-like system, the probabihty that the
most competent government is installed is the probability that one of the players ij, . .
.
, i^ is
in the government immediately after the shock. This probability is higher than the probability
that any given plaj^er is among i\, . .
.
, i\, which is k/n > 2/n. This completes the proof.
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Appendix B
This Appendix presents an extensive-form game in wliich individuals make proposals for alter-
native governments and vote over alternatives. It defines the Markov perfect equilibria (MPE)
of this game, establishes their existence and their properties, and shows the equivalence between
the notions of MPE and that of the (stochastic) political equilibrium defined in the text. We
also provide a number of examples referred to in the text (e.g., on possibility of cyclic MPE or
pohtical equilibria, and on changes in expected competence).
Dynamic Game
We now present a dynamic game that captures certain saUent features of the process of govern-
ment change. This game involves different individuals proposing alternative governments and
then all individuals (including current members of the government) voting over these proposals.
For reasons that will become clear belo'v\', the game also involves an additional state variable,
which governs when new proposals and transitions can be made.
Let us first introduce this additional state variable, denoted by v\ which determines whether
the current government can be changed. In particular, v' takes two \'alues; u' = s corresponds
to a "sheltered" pohtical situation (or "stable" political situation, although we reserve the term
"stable" for go\-ernments which persist over time) and u' = u designates an unstable situation.
The government can only be changed during unstable times. A sheltered political situation desta-
bilizes (becomes unstable) with probabihty r in each period, that is, P (u* = u
\
v^~^ = s) = r.
These events are independent across periods and we also assume that v*^ = u. An unstable situa-
tion becomes sheltered when an incumbent government sur\'ives a challenge or is not challenged
at all (as explained below).
We next describe the procedure for challenging an incumbent government. We start with
some government G^ at time t. If at time t the situation is unstable, then all individuals i G X are
ordered according to some sequence r)Qt. Individuals, in turn, nominate subsets of alternative
governments A^ C G \ {G^} that will be part of the primaries. An individual may choose not
to nominate any alternative government, in which case he may choose A* = 0. All nominated
governments (except the incumbent) make up the set .4', so
A^ = {G eg\{G*} -.G e A, for some i e l} . (Al)
If .4' ^ 0, then all alternatives in A* take part in the primaries at time t. The primaries work
as follows. AU of the alternatives in .4' are ordered ^Qt (1) .^Qt (2) , . . . ,E,Qt (|-^*[) according to
some pre-specified order (depending on A^ and the current government G*). We refer to tliis
order as the protocol, ^^t . The primaries are then used to determine the challenging government
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G" t ^*. In particular, we start with G\ given by the first element of the protocol ^^t, ^^t (1).
At the second step, G'l is voted against the second element, ^Qt (2). We assume that all votings
are sequential (and show in the Appendix that the sequence in which votes take place does
not have any affect on the outcome). If more than n/2 of individuals support the latter, then
G2 = ^Qt (2); otherwise G'2 = Gj. Proceeding in order, Gj, G4, . . ., and G',_^ti are determined,
and G' is equal to the last element of the sequence, G'^^t 1 • This ends the primary.
After the primary, the challenger G' is voted against the incumbent government G*. G' wins
if and only if a winning coalition of individuals (i.e., a coalition that belpngs to Wnt) supports
G' . Otherwise, we say that the incumbent government G* wins. If ^* = to start with, then
there is no challenger and the incumbent government is again the winner.
If the incumbent goverrmient wins, it stays in power, and moreover the political situation
becomes sheltered, that is, G*"*"^ = G* and u*+-' = s. Otherwise, the challenger becomes the
new government, but the situation remains unstable, that is, G*"^^ = G' and v^'^^ — v* = u. All
individuals receive stage payoff m, (G*) (we assume that the new government starts acting from
the next period on).
More formally, the exact procedure is as follows.
,
'
• Period t = 0,1,2,... begins with government G* in power. If the political situation is
sheltered, v^ = s, then each individual i £ I receives stage payoff uj (G'); in the next
period, G^~^'^ = G*, f*"*"^ = u* = s with probability 1 — r and v^^^ = u with probability r.
• If the poUtical situation is unstable, vt — u, then the following events take place:
1. Individuals are ordered according to i]Qt, and in this sequence, each individual i
nominates a subset of feasible governments A^ C Q \ {G^] for the primaries. These
determine the set of alternatives A^ as in (Al).
2. If .4' = 0, then we say that the incumbent government wins, G*"*""^ = G*, u*"*"^ = s,
and each individual receives states payoff u* (G*). If A^ 7^ 0, then the alternatives
in A*^ are ordered according to protocol <J^t.
3. If ^' 7^ 0, then the alternatives in A^ are voted against each other. In particular, at
the first step, Gj = ^^' (1). If |y4*| > 1, then for 2 < j < \A*\, a.t step j, alternative
G'._i is voted against <^^, (j). Voting in the primary takes place as follows: all
individuals vote yes or no sequentially according to some pre-specified order, and
G' = S^Qt (j) if and only if the set of the individuals who voted yes, y'-, is a simple
majority (i.e., if y^ > n/2); otherwise, G^ = Gj_j. The challenger is determined as
44
4. Government G' challenges the incumbent government G', and voting in the election
takes place. In particular, all individuals vote yes or no sequentially according to
some pre-specified order, and G' wins if and only if the set of the individuals who
voted yes, 3^"', is a winning coalition in G' (i.e., if 3^* £ ^g'^' otherwise, G* wins.
5. If G' wins, then G'+i = G*, v^+^ = s; if G' wins, then G^+^ = G' , u*+i = u. In either
case, and each indi\'idual obtains stage payoff u^ (G').
There are several important features about this dj-namic game that are worth emphasizing.
First, the set of winning coalitions, W^t when the government is G^ determines which proposals
for govermnental change are accepted. Second, to specif}' a well defined game we had to introduce
the pre-specified order tjq in which individuals nominate alternatives for the primaries, the
protocol ^Q for the order in which alternatives are considered, and also the order in which votes
are cast. Ideally we would like these orders not to have a major influence on the structure of
equilibria, since they are not an essential part of the economic environment and we do not have
a good way of mapping the specific orders to reality. We will see that this is indeed the case
in the equilibria of interest. Finally, the rate at which political situations become unstable, r,
has an important influence on payoffs by determining the rate at which opportunities to change
the government arise. In what follows, we assume that r is relatively small, so that political
situations are not unstable most of the time. Here, it is also important that political instabiUty
ceases after the incumbent government withstands a challenge (or if there is no challenge). This
can be interpreted as the government having survived a "no-confidence" motion. In addition,
as in the text, we focus on situations in which the discount factor /3 is large.
Strategies and Definition of Equilibrium
We define strategies and equilibria in the usual fashion. In particular, let /i*''^ denote the historj'
of the game up to period t and stage Q* in period t (there are several stages in period t if v' = u).
This history includes all governments, all proposals, votes, and stochastic events up to this time.
The set of histories is denoted by 'H*'*^ . A history h*'^ can also be decomposed into two parts.
We can wTite h'-'^ = (/]',(5*) and correspondingly, Ti'''^ = H^ x Q* , where h^ summarizes all
events that have taken place up to period t - I and Q* is the list of events that have taken place
\^dthin the time instant t when there is an opportunity to change the government.
A strategy for individual i g I, denoted by at, maps Ti.''-^ (for all t and Q*) into a proposal
when i nominates an alternative government (i.e., at the first stage of the period where v' = u)
and a vote for each possible proposal at each possible decision node (recall that the ordering of
alternatives is automatic and is done according to a protocol). A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SPE) is a strategy profile {o'i},^j such that the strategy of each i is the best response to the
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strategies of all other individuals for all histories. Since there can be several SPE in dj^namic
games, many supported by complex trigger strategies, which are not our focus here, in this
Appendix, we will limit our attention to the Markovian subset of SPEs. We next introduce the
standard definition of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in pure strategies:
Definition 3 A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is an SPE profile of strategies {o'*}jgj such that
a* for each i in each period t depends only on C*. F*, W*, and Q* (previous actions taken in
period t).
MPEs are natural in such dynamic games, since they enable individuals to condition on all
of the payoff-relevant information, but rule out complicated trigger-like strategies, which are
not our focus in this paper. It turns out that even MPEs potentially lead to a very rich set of
behavior. For this reason, it is also useful to consider subsets of MPEs, in particular, acyclic
MPEs and order-independent MPEs. As discussed in the text, an equilibrium is acycUc if cycles
(changing the initial government but then reinstalling it at some future date) do not take place
along the equilibrium path. Cyclical MPEs are both less realistic and also more difficult to
characterize, motivating our main focus on acyclic MPEs. Formally, we have:
Definition 4 An MPE a* is cyclic if the probability that there exist ij < ^2 < ^3 such that
Qti
_
Qti
_^
Qt2 Q^iQfig ifiQ equilibrium path is positive. An MPE a* is acychc if it is not cyclic.
Another relevant subset of MPEs, order-independent MPEs or simply order-independent
equihbria, is introduced by Moldovanu and Winter (1995). These equiUbria require that
strategies should not depend on the order in which certain events (e.g., proposal-making) un-
fold. Here we generalize (and slightly modify) their definition for our present context. For
this purpose, let us denote the above-described game when the set of protocols is given by
i = {ic \ S'S GAME [<J] and denote the set of feasible protocols hy X
.
Definition 5 Consider GAME [^] . Then a' is an order-independent equiUbrium for
GAME \S,] if for any ^' 6 M, there exists an equilibrium a'* of GAME \^'\ such that a* and a'*
lead to the same distributions of equilibrium governments C^ [ G* for t > t.
We will establish the relationship between a'cyclic and order-independent equilibria in The-
orem 5."^^
' One could also require order independence with respect to 77 as well as with respect to n. It can be easily
verified that the equilibria we focus on already satisfy this property and hence, this is not added as a requirement
of "order independence" in Definition 5.
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Characterization of Markov Perfect Equilibria
Recall the mapping defined hy 4> : Q -^ Q he the mapping defined by (6). We use the next
theorem to establish the equivalence between political equilibria and MPE in the dynamic game.
Theorem 4 Consider the game described above. Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold and let
: Q -^ Q be the political equilibrium given by (6). Then there exists £ > such that if P < 1 — e
and r/ (1 — /3) > e then for any protocol ^ e A':
1. There exists an acyclic MPE in pure strategies a*
.
2. Take an acyclic MPE in pure or mixed strategies a* . Then we have that
• if (G^) = G°, then there are no transitions;
• otherwise, with probability 1 there exists a period t where the government (G°) is
proposed, wins the primaries, and wins the power struggle against G^ . After that,
there are no transitions, so G^ = <p (G^) for all t >t.
Proof of Theorem 4. Part 1. The proof of this theorem rehes on Lemma 1 introduced
in Appendix A. We take /3q such that for any P > Pq the following inequalities are satisfied:
for any G, G', H,H' <S g and i € I ; w, (G) < w^ {H) implies
(l-^l^l)w, (G')+/3l^'lu,v(G) < (l-p''^^')w,{H')+p\^^w,{H). (A2)
For each G E Q, define the following mapping Xg ^ ^ S-
' 4j[H) liH ^G
Xgm-
, ^ iiH = G
Take any protocol ^ ^ X . Now take some node of the game in the beginning of some period
t when I/* = u. Consider the stages of the dynamic game that take place in this period as a
finite game by assigning the following payoffs to the terminal nodes:
f
- w.{H) + ^^w,{0{H)) ,iH^G
where H = C^'^^ is the government that is scheduled to be in power in period t + I, i.e., the
government that defeated the incumbent G^ if it was defeated and G* itself if it was not. For
any such period t, take a SPE in pure strategies ctq = ct^, of the truncated game, such that this
SPE is the same for any two nodes with the same incumbent government; the latter requirement
ensures that once we map these SPEs to a strategy profile a* of the entire game GAME{£^], this
profile will be Markovian. In what follows, we prove that for any G & Q, (a) if a*Q is played,
47
then there is no transition if (p (C) = G and there is a transition to 4) {G) otherwise and (b)
actions in profile a" are best responses if continuation payoffs are taken from profile a* rather
than assumed to be given by (A3). These two results will complete the proof of part 1.
We start with part (a); take any government G and consider the SPE of the truncated gam.e
a*Q. First, consider the subgame where some alternative H has won the primaries and challenges
the incumbent government G. Clearly, proposal H will be accepted if and only if (b [H) > G. This
imphes, in particular, from the construction of mapping 4>, that if (p [G) = G, then no alternative
H may be accepted. Second, consider the subgame where nominations have been made and the
players are voting according to protocol ^q. We prove that if (p{G) £ A, then 4>{G) wins the
primaries regardless of
^
(and subsequently wins against G, as (f>{cl)[G')) = (p{G) >~ G. This is
proved by backward induction: assuming that (p (G) has number q in the protocol, let us show
that if it makes its waj^ to jth round, where q < j < \A\, then it will win this round. The base is
evident: ii (p (G) wins in the last round, players will get v (G, (p (G)) = Xg (4' (G)) = jztr''^' {<P (G))
(we drop the subscript for player to refer to w and v as vectors of payoffs), while if it loses, they
either get v{G,H) for H ^ (p{G). Clearly, voting for (p{G) is better for a majority of the
population, and thus cp (G) wins the primaries and defeats G. The step is proven similarlj',
hence, in the subgame which starts from gth round, (p (G) defeats the incumbent government.
Since this holds irrespective of what happens in previous rounds, this concludes the second step.
Third, consider the stage where nominations are made, and suppose, to obtain a contradiction,
that <p (G) is not proposed. Then, in the equilibrium, players get a payoff vector v (G, H), where
H 7^ 4>{G). But then, clearly, any member of (p{G) has a profitable deviation, which is to
nominate <p (G) instead of or in addition to what he is nominating in profile a*Q. Since in a SPE
there should be no profitable deviations, this competes the proof of part (a).
Part (b) is straightforward. Suppose that the incumbent government is G. If some alternative
H defeats government G, then from part (a), the payoffs that players get starting from next
period are given by jzrg'^i i^) ''^^4>{H) = H and w^ {H) + —011)1 {(p{H)) otherwise; in either case,
the payoff is exactly' equal to Vi {G,H). If no alternative defeats government G, then z^'"^-^ = s
(the situation becomes stable), and after that, government G stays until the situation becomes
unstable, and government (p (G) is in power in all periods ever since; this again gives the payoff
i_g,'[_^\ Wi (G) + ii^g)n-Rii_T)) ''^i i'P {G))- This implies that the continuation payoffs are indeed
given by Vi (G, H), which means that if in the entire game profile a* is played, no player has a
profitable deviation. This proves part 1.
Pcirt 2. Suppose a* is an acyclic MPE. Take any government G = G* at some period t in
some node on or off the equilibrium path. Define binary relation -^ on set Q as follows: G -^ H
if and only if either G = H and G has a positive probability of staying in power when G^ = G
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and u^ = u, or G y^ H and G*"^^ = H with positive probability if C' = G and u* — u. Define
another binary relation h^ on cj as follows: G h^ iJ if any only if there exists a sequence (perhaps
empty) of different governments H\, . .
.
. Hq such that G ^ Hi ^ H2 —^ -^ Hq = H and
H ^ H. In other words. G >—* H ii there is an on-equilibrium path that involves a sequence
of transitions from G to H and stabiUzation of pohtical situation at H. Now, since a* is
an acyclic equilibrium, there is no sequence that contains at least two different governments
Hi Hq such that Hi -^ H2 —* -^ Hq -^ Hi. Suppose that for at least one G & Q, the
set [H
€ Q : G '-^ H) contains at least two elements. From acyclicity it is easy to derive the
existence of government G with the following properties: {H E Q : G ^-* H} contains at least
two elements, but for any element H of this set, {H'
€ Q : H 1-^ H'] is a singleton.
Consider the restriction of profile a* on the part of the game where government G is in
power, and call it cTq. The way we picked G implies that some government may defeat G with
a positive probability, and for any such government H the subsequent evolution prescribed by
profile a' does not exhibit any uncertainty, and the political situation will stabilize at the unique
government H' j^ G (but perhaps H' = H) such that H ^^ H' in no more than \Q\ — 2 steps.
Given our assumption (A2) and the assumption that r is small, this implies that no player is
indifferent between two terminal nodes of this period which ultimately lead to two different
governments H'l and H^, or between one where G stays and one where it is overthrowm. But
players act sequentially, one at a time, which means that the last player to act on the equilibrium
path when it is still possible to get different outcomes must mix, and therefore be indifferent.
This contradiction proves that for any G, government H such that G >—* H is well defined.
Denote this government by V (G).
To complete the proof, we must show that V (G) = cp (G) for all G. Suppose not; then,
since V' {G) >- G (otherwise G would not be defeated as players would prefer to stay in G), we
must have that T^jg) > r^(G) . This implies that if some alternative H such that H 1-^ cp (G) is
nominated, it must win the primaries; this is easily shown by backward induction. If no such
alternative is nominated, then, since there is a player who prefers cp{G) to V (G) (any member
of 0(G) does), such player would be better off deviating and nominating ^(G). A deviation
is not possible in equihbrium. so V' (G) = (t>{G) for all G. By construction of mapping ip, this
imphes that there are no transitions if G = (p [G) and one or more transitions ultimately leading
to government (G) otherwise. This completes the proof.
The most important result from this theorem is that acychc MPE lead to equilibrium tran-
sitions given by the same mapping (p^ defined in (6), which characterize political equilibria as
defined in Definition 1. This result thus provides further justification for the notion of political
equihbrium used in our main analysis.
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The hypothesis that r is sufficiently small ensures that stable political situations are suffi-
ciently "stable," so that if the government passes a "no-confidence" voting, it stays in power
for some nontrivial amount of time. Such a requirement is important to ensure that an MPE
in pure strategies exists (which in turn allows us to obtain a characterization of equilibria),
and is related in spirit to the second requirement in part 2 of Definition 1. Example 7, which
is presented next, illustrates the potential for nonexistence of pure strategy MPE without this
assumption.
Example 7 Suppose that the society consists of five individuals 1,2,3,4,5 (n = 5). Suppose
each government consists of two members, so /c = 2. There is "almost perfect" democracy
(/ = 1), and suppose m = 3. Assume
F/jji = 30 — min {i.j} — 5max{i,j} .
Moreover, assume that all individuals care a lot about being in the government, and about the
competence if they are not in the government; however, if an individual compares utility of being
a member of two different governments, she is almost indifferent. In this environment, there are
two fixed points of mapping d>: {1,2} and {3, 4}.
Let us show that there is no MPE in pure strategies if u' = u for all t (so that the incmnbent
government is contested in each period). Suppose that there is such equilibrium for some protocol
^. One can easily see that no alternative may win if the incumbent government is {1, 2}: indeed,
if in equilibrium there is a transition to some G ^ {^,'^}, then in the last voting, when {1,2}
is challenged by G, both 1 and 2 would be better off rejecting the alternative and postponing
transition to the government (or a chain of governments) that they like less. It is also not hard
to show that any of the governments that include 1 or 2 (i.e., {1,3}, {1,4}, {1, 5}, {2,3}, {2,4},
and {2,5}) lose the contest for power to {1,2} in equilibrium. Indeed, if {1,2} is included in
the primaries, it must be the winner (intuitively, this happens because {1,2} is the Condorcet
winner in simple majority votings). Given that, it must always be included in the primaries,
for otherwise individual 1 would have a profitable deviation and nominate {1,2}. We can now
conclude that government {3,4} is stable: any government which includes 1 or 2 will immediately
lead to {1, 2} which is undesirable for both 3 and 4, while {3, 5} and {4, 5} are worse than {3, 4}
for 3 and 4 as well; therefore, if there is some transition in equilibrium, then 3 and 4 are better
off staying at {3, 4} for an extra period, which makes a profitable deviation.
We now consider the governments {3,5} and {4.5}. First, we rule out the possibility that
from {3,5} the individuals move to {4,5} and vice versa. Indeed, if this was the case, then in
the last voting when the government is {3, 5} and the alternative is {4, 5}, individuals 1, 2, 3, 5
would be better off blocking this transition (i.e., postponing it for one period). Hence, either
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one of governments {3, 5} and {4, 5} is stable or one of them leads to {3, 4} in one step or {1, 2}
in two steps. We consider these three possibilities for the government {3,5} and arrive to a
contradiction; the case of {4, 5} may be considered similarljf and also leads to a contradiction.
It is trivial to see that a transition to {1,2} (in one or two steps) cannot be an equilibrium.
If this were the case, then in the last voting, individuals 3 and 5 would block this transition,
since they are better off staying in {3,5} for one more period (even if the intermediate step to
{1,2} is a government that includes either 3 or 5). This is a profitable deviation which cannot
happen in an equilibrium. It is also trivial to check that {3, 5} cannot be stable. Indeed, if this
was the case, then if alternative {3,4} won the primaries, it would be accepted, as individuals
1.2.3.4 would support it. At the same time, any alternative that would lead to {1,2} would
not be accepted, and neither will be alternative {4,5}, unless it leads to {3,4}. Because of
that, alternative {3,4} would make its way through the primaries if nominated, for it is better
than {3,5} for a simple majority of individuals. But then {3,4} must be nominated, for, say,
individual 4 is better off if it were, since he prefers {3, 4} to {3. 5}. Consequently, if {3, 5} were
stable, we would get a contradiction, since we proved that in this case, {3, 4} must be nominated,
win the primaries and take over the incumbent government {3. 5}.
The remaining case to consider is where from {3,5} the individuals transit to {3,4}. Note
that in this case, alternative {1,2} would be accepted if it won the primaries: indeed, individuals
1 and 2 prefer {1,2} over {3,4} for obvious reasons, but individual 5 is also better off if {1,2}
is accepted, even if the former grants him an extra period of staying in power (as the discount
factor ,3 is close to 1). Similarly, any alternative which would lead to {1,2} in the next period
must also be accepted in the last voting. This imphes, however, that such alternative ({1,2}
or some other one which leads to {1,2}) must necessarily win the primaries if nominated (by
the previous discussion, {4,5} may not be a stable government, and hence the only choice the
individuals make is whether to move ultimately to {3,4} or to {1.2}, of which the)' prefer the
latter). This, in turn, means that {1,2} must be nominated, for otherwise, say, individual 1
would be better off doing that. Hence, we have come to a contradiction in all possible cases,
which proves that for no protocol
,f there exists a MPE in pure strategies. Thus, the proof that
both cyclic and acyclic MPEs do not exist is complete.
Cycles, Acyclicity, and Order-Independent Equilibria
The acyclicity requirement in Theorem 4 (similar to the requirement of acyclic pohtical equi-
librimn in Theorem 1 in the text) is not redundant. We next provide an example of a cyclic
MPE.
Example 8 Consider a society consisting of five individuals (n = 5). The only feasible govern-
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ments are {1} , {2} , {3} , {4} , {5}. Suppose that there is "perfect democracy," i.e. Ig = I =
for G & Q^ , and that voting takes the form of a simple majority rule, i.e mc = m = 3 for aU G.
Suppose also that the competences of different feasible governments are given by
Tfi} = 5 - i,
so {1} is the best government.
Assume also that stage payoffs are given as in Example 2. In particular.
These utilities imply that each individual receives a high value from being part of the government
relative to the utility she receives from government competence.
Finally, we define the protocols Cg as follows. If G = {!}, then ^^^^^^ = ^jj2}.{3},{4},{5}} ^
({3} , {4} , {5} , {2}) and
^fij for A ^ ({3} , {4} , {5} , {2}) is obtained from ^{^^''"'^ by dropping
governments which are not in A: for example, Cm ~ ({^} ' {^} > {2})- For other govern-
ments, we define ^«J>'W,{4},{5}} ^ (^^^ ^-^ ^ ^^^ ^3^^^
^{{i},{2},{4},(5}}
^
^^^^ , {1} , {2} , {4}),
^{{j},{2},{3},{5}} ^ (^^^ ^2} , {3} , {5}) and ^{g}.{2},{3},{4}} ^ ^^3} , {3} , {4} , {!}), and for other
A again define <^^ by dropping the governments absent in A. Then there exists an equilibrium
where the governments follow a cycle of the form {5} —> {4} —+ {3} -^ {2} -^ {1} ^ {5} —>••.
To verify this claim, consider the following nomination strategies by the individuals. If the
government is {!}, two individuals nominate {2} and the other three nominate {5}; if it is {2},
two individuals nominate {3} and three nominate {!}; if it is {3}. two nominate {4} and three
nominate {2}; if it is {4}, two nominate {5} and three nominate {3}; if it is {5), two nominate
{1} and three nominate {4}. . _ . ;,
Let us next turn to voting strategies. Here we appeal to Lemma 1 from Acemoglu, Egorov
and Sonin (2008), which shows that in this class of games, it is sufficient to focus on strategies
in which individuals always vote for the alternative yielding the highest payoff for them at each
stage. In equilibrium, any alternative government which wins the primaries, on or off equilibrium
path, subsequently wins against the incumbent government. In particular, in such an equilibrium
supporting the incumbent government breaks a cycle, but only one person (the member of the
incumbent government) is in favor of it. We next show if only one individual deviates at the
nomination stage, then next government in the cycle still wins in the primaries. Suppose that the
current government is {3} (other cases are treated similarly). Then by construction, governments
{2} and {4} are necessarily nominated, and {1} or {5} may either be nominated or not. If the
last voting in the primaries is between {2} and {4}, then {2} wins: indeed, all individuals
know that both alternatives can take over the incumbent government, but {2} is preferred by
individuals 1, 2, and 5 (because they would want to be government members earlier rather than
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later). If, however, the last stage involves voting between {4} on the one hand and either {1}
or {5} on the other, then {4} wins for similar reason. Now, if either {1} or {5} is nominated,
then in the first voting it is voted against {2}. All individuals know that accepting {2} will
ultimately lead to a transition to {2}, whereas supporting {1} or (5} will lead to {4}. Because
of that, at least three individuals (1, 2, 5) will support {2}. This proves that {2} will win
against the incumbent government {3}, provided that {2} and {4} participate in the primaries,
which is necessarily the case if no more than one individual deviates. This, in turn, implies that
nomination strategies are also optimal in the sense that there is no profitable one-shot deviation
for any indi^'idual. We can easilj' verify that this holds for other incumbent governments as well.
We have thus proved that the strategies we constructed form an SPE; since they are also
Markovian. it is a MPE as well. Along the equihbrium path, the governments follow a cycle
{5} ^ {4} -^ {3} -^ {2} —> {1} -^ {5} —^ . We can similarly construct a cycle that moves in
the other direction: {1} —» {2} —» {3} -^ {4} -^ {5} -^ {1} -^ (though this would require
different protocols). Hence, for some protocols, cyclic equilibria are possible.
Intuitivelj', a cycle enables different individuals that will not be part of the limiting (stable)
government to enjoy the benefits of being in power. This example, and the intuition we suggest,
also highlight that even when there is a cyclic equilibrium, an acyclic equilibrium still exists.
(This is clear from the statement in Theorem 1, and also from Theorem 5). Example 8 also
makes it clear that cycUc equilibria are somewhat artificial and less robust. Moreover, as em-
phasized in Theorems 1 and 4, acyclic equilibria have an intuitive and economically meaningful
structure. In the text, we showed how certain natural restrictions rule out cyclic political equi-
libria (Theorem 2). Here we take a complementary approach and show that the refinement of
MPE introduced above, order independence, is also sufficient to rule out cyclic equilibria (even
without the conditions in Theorem 2). This is established in the next theorem, which also shows
that with order-independent MPE, multi-step transitions, which are possible under MPE as
shown in the next example, will also be ruled out.
Example 9 Take the setup of Example 8, with the exception that Zni = 1 (so that consent of
individual 1 is needed to change the government when the government is {!}). It is then easy to
check that the strategy profile constructed in Example 8 is a MPE in this case as well. However,
since individual 1 will vote against any alternative which wins the primaries, the difference is
that alternative {5} wiU not be accepted in equilibrium and government {1} will persist. Hence,
in equilibrium, the transitions are as follows: {5} -^ {4} —> {3} -^ {2} -^ {1}.
We now establish that order-independent equilibria always exist, are always acyclic, and lead
to rapid (one-step) equilibrium transitions. As such, this theorem will be a strong complement
53
to Theorem 2 in the text, though its proof requires a shghtly stronger version of Assumption 3,
which we now introduce.
Assumption 3' For any i G 1 and any sequence of feasible governments, Hi,H2, ,Hq € Q
(for q > 2), we have
Wi{Hi) ^ -^ .q- 1
Recall that Assumption 3 imposed that no two feasible governments have exactly the same
competence. Assumption 3' strengthens this and requires that the competence of any government
should not be the average of the competences of other feasible governments. Like Assumption
3, Assumption 3' is satisfied "generically," in the sense that if it were not satisfied for a society,
anj' small perturbation of competence levels would restore it.
Theorem 5 Consider the game described above. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3' hold
and let (j) : Q -^ Q be the political equilibrium defined by (6). Then there exists e > such that
if (3 < 1 — e and r/ (1 — /?) > £• for any protocol ^ E X:
1. There exists an order-independent MPE in pure strategies a*
.
.'.,''-
2. Any order-independent MPE in pure str^ategies a* is acyclic.
3. In any order-independent MPE a* , we have that: ' ' '- ' '
.
.-
• if 4> (G°) = C^ , then there are no transitions and government G* = G^ for each t;
• if 4> {G^) r G^ ! then there is a transition from, G^ to fj [G'^) in period t = 0, and
there are no more transitions: G^ = <p (G"*^) for all t > 1.
4- In any order-independent MPE a* , the payoff of each individual i G 1 is given by
-" '^-
-•
•
n? = ^.(G°) + ^i..(^(G°)). - ;•
Proof of Theorem 5. Part 1. In part 1 of Theorem 4, we proved that for any ^ & X
there exists a MPE in pure strategies, and from part 2 of Theorem 4 it follows that these MPE
constructed for different S, G X have the same equilibrium path of governments. The existence
of an order-independent equilibrium follows.
Part 2. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that order-independent MPE in pure strategies
a* is cychc. Define mapping x • 5 ~* t? as follows: x (G) = i? if for any node on equihbrium
path which starts with government G^ = G and u' = u, the next government G*"*"^ = H. Since
the equilibrium is in pure strategies, this mapping is well defined and unique. The assumption
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that equilibrium a* is acyclic implies that there is a sequence of pair-wise different governments
Hi.Ho.. ,Hg (where q > 2) such that x {Hj) = Hj+i for 1 < j < q and x {Hq) = Hi. Without
loss of generality, assume that H2 has the least competence of all governments Hi,H2- , Hq.
If q = 2, then the cycle has two elements, of which H2 is the worse government. However, this
implies that H2 cannot defeat Hi even if it wins the primaries, since all players, except, perhaps,
those in H2 \ Hi, prefer Hi to an eternal cycle of Hi and H2- This immediate contradiction
implies that we onh' need to consider the case g > 3.
If g > 3, then, by the choice of H2, Fj/j > r//2 and Fh^ > ^H2- Without loss of generalit}',
we ma}' assume that the protocol is such that if the incumbent government is Hi , Hs is put at
the end (if H3 is nominated); this is possible since cr* is an order-independent equilibrium. By
definition, we must have that proposal H2 is nominated and accepted in this equilibrimii along
the equilibrium path.
Let us first prove that alternative Hs will defeat the incumbent government Hi if it wins
the primaries. Consider a player i who would have weakly preferred H2: the next equilibrium
government, to win over Hi if H2 won the primaries; since H2 defeats Hi on the equilibrium
path, such players must form a winning coalition in Hi. If i ^ H2, then if2 brings i the lowest
utiUty of all governments in the cycle; hence, i would be willing to skip H2', hence, such i would
be strictlj' better off if H'i defeated Hi. Now suppose i e H2. If, in addition, i & Hi, then he
prefers Hi to H2. Assume, to obtain a contradiction, that i weakly prefers that H^ does not
defeat Hi; it is then easy to see that since he prefers Hi to H2, he would strictly prefer H2 not
to defeat Hi if H2 won the primaries. The last case to consider is i € H2 and i ^ Hi. If /? is
sufficiently close to 1, then, as implied by Assumption 3', plaj'er i wiU either prefer that both
Ho and H^ defeat Hi or that none of them does. Consequently, all players who would support
H2 also support H^. which proves that Ht, would be accepted if nominated.
Let us prove that in equilibrium if3 is not nominated. Suppose the opposite, i.e., that H3
is nominated. Then H2 cannot win the primaries: indeed, in the last voting, ii"2 must face
H3, and since, as we showed, only members of Hn may prefer that Hn rather than H^ is the
next government, H'j, must defeat if2 in this voting. This means that in equilibrium H^ is not
nominated.
Consider, however, what would happen if all alternatives were nominated. Suppose that
some government G then wins the primaries. It must necessarily be the case that G defeats
Hi: indeed, if instead Hi would stay in power, then G 7^ H3 (we know that H3 would defeat
iii). and this imphes that in the last voting of the primaries, Hs would defeat G. Let us denote
the continuation utility that player i gets if some government H comes to power as i;, (H). If
there is at least one plaj'er with Vi{G) > Vi (H2), then this pla^^er has a profitable deviation
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during nominations: he can nominate all alternatives and ensure that G wins the primaries and
defeats Hi. Otherwise, if v^ [G] < Vi {H2) for all players, we must have that d,- {G) < Vj (H^)
for a winning coalition of players, which again means that G cannot win the primaries. This
contradiction proves that for the protocol we chose, H2 cannot be the next government, and this
imphes that there are no cyclic order-independent equihbria in pure strategies.
Part 3. The proof is similar to the proof of part 2. We define mapping x in the same way
and choose government H such that x ix {H)) 7^ X {H), but x [x {x i^))) = xix i^})- We then
take a protocol which puts government x {x {H)) at the end whenever it is nominated and come
to a similar contradiction.
Part 4. This follows straightforwardly from part 3, since the only transition may happen
at period t = 0.
Stochastic Markov Perfect Equilibria
We next characterize the structure of (order-independent) stochastic MPE (that is, order-
independent MPE in the presence of stochastic shocks) and establish the equivalence between
order-independent (or acyclic) MPE and our notion of (acyclic stochastic) pohtical equilibrium.
Once again, the most important conclusion from this theorem is that MPE of the dynamic game
discussed here under stochastic shocks lead to the same behavior as our notion of stochastic
pohtical equilibrium introduced in Definition 2.
, :•. .
Theorem 6 Consider the above-described stochastic environment. Suppose that Assumptions
1, 2, 3', and 4 hold. Let (f)' : Q ^> Q be the political equilibrium defined by (6) for F^. Then
there exists c > such that if P < 1 — e, r/ [1 — /S) > e and 5 > e then for any protocol ^ <E X
,
we have the following results.
1. There exists aii order-independent MPE in pure strategies. ; .,
2. Suppose that between periods ti and t2 there are no shocks. Then in. any order-independent
MPE m pure strategies, the following results hold:
.
- * if 4> {G^^) ~ G^*^' then there are no transitions between ti and ^2/
• if 4> (G'*') 7^ G^\- then alternative cp (C^) is accepted during the first period of insta-
bility (after ti).
Proof of Theorem 6. Part 1. If 5 is sufficiently small, then the possibility of shocks does
not change the ordering of continuation utilities at the end of any period any for any player.
Hence, the equilibrium constructed in the proof of part 1 of Theorem 4 proves this statement
as well.
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Part 2. If S is sufficiently small, the proof of Theorem 5 (parts 2 and 3) maj' be applied
here with minimal changes, which are omitted.
.
Examples
Example 10 This example shows that in stochastic environments, even though likeUhood of
the best government coming to power is higher under more democratic institutions, the expected
competence of stable governments maj' be lower. Suppose n = 9, fc = 4,/i=3, m = 5. Let
the individuals be denoted 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, with decreasing ability. Namely, suppose that
abilities of individuals 1,...,8 are given by 7, = 2^~', and 79 = —10^. Then the 14 stable
governments, in the order of decreasing competence, are given as:
1234 2358
,
,
,
1256 2367
1278 2457
1357 2468
1368 3456
1458 3478
1467 5678
(Note that this would be the list of stable governments for any decreasing sequence {7,},_i,
except for that, say, rnsggi may become than rri458i.) Now consider the same parameters,
but take I2 = 2. Then there are three stable governments 1234, 1567, and 2589. For a random
initial government, the probability that individual 9 will be a part of the stable government that
evolves is j|g = jg: of (^) = 126 feasible governments there are 9 governments that lead to
2589. which are 2589, 2689, 2789, 3589, 3689, 3789, 4589, 4689, and 4789. Clearly, the expected
competence of government for Zt = 2 is negative, whereas for /i = 3 it is positive, as no stable
government includes the least competent individual 9.
Excimple 11 There are n = 19 players and 3 feasible go^'ernments: A = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7},
B = {7.8,9,10.11,12,13}, C = {13,14,15,16,17,18,19} (so k = 7). The discount factor is
sufficiently close to 1, say, /3 > 0.999. The institutional parameters of these governments and
players' utilities from them are given in the following table.
G h VI
G
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
A 10 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 60 60 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 45
B 11 60 20 20 20 20 20 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 20 20 20 20 20 20
C 12 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
The utilities are constructed as follows. Members of government A receive 90, non-members
receive 30, except for 19, who receives 45. Members of B receive 80, except for 7 who receives 30,
non-members receive 10, except for 1,2,3 who receive 60. Note that Assumption 1 holds, and
that the condition 7 = /c < m < n — A: = 12 is satisfied for all feasible governments. Moreover,
m.Q > n/2 for all go\-ernments, w'hich means that any two winning coalitions intersect.
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We claim that 4) given by (j) (-4) = 0,4) (B) = A, cp (C) = B is & (cyclic) political equilibrium.
Let us first check property (ii) of Definition 1. The set of players with Vi{C) > Vi{A) is
{10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19} (as /3 is close to 1, the simplest way to check this condition
for player i is to verifj' whether Wi (A) is greater than or less than the average of Wi [A], wi {B),
Wi (C); the case where these are equal deserves more detailed study, and is critical for this
example). These ten players form a winning coalition in A. The set of players with Vi (A) >
Vi (B) is {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19}; these eleven players form a winning coalition in B.
The set of players with V,, {B) > V^ (C) is {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}; these twelve players
form a winning coalition in C.
Let us now check condition (ii) of Definition 1. Suppose the current government is A; then
the only H we need to consider is B. Indeed, ii H = C then Vi{H) > Vi{4>{A)) = V^ (C)
is impossible for any player, and ii H = A, then the V, (H) > Vi{(p{A}) cannot hold for a
winning coalition of players, as the opposite inequality Vi {(p{A}) > Vi {A) holds for a winning
coahtion (condition (i)), and any two winning coalitions intersect in this example. But for
H = B, condition (ii) of Definition 1 is also satisfied, as Vi (B) > Wi {A) / (1 — /?) holds for
players {10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18} only, which is not a winning coahtion, as there are only
nine players (we used the fact that player 19 has V^ (A) > Vi [B], but Vi [B) > w^ {A) / (1 - /?)
for P close to 1, as 45 is the average of 20 and 70). If the current government is B, then, as before,
only government H = C needs to be considered. But Vi (C) > K (A) holds for ten players only,
and this is not a winning coalition in B. Finally, if the current government is C, then again,
only the case H = A needs to be checked. But Vi (A) > Vi {B) holds for only eleven players,
and this is not a winning coalition in C. So, both conditions of Definition 1 are satisfied, and
thus (p is a cychc political equilibrium.
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